

Electrified Sovereignty as Solution to Iran War Energy Shock

Why UK and EU Energy Security Now Depends on Rapid Digitalisation, Grid Reform and Clean Power Scale-Up

By Nafeez Ahmed, Divyesh Desai, Sandrine Dixson-Decleve, Vicente Ibor Lopez Mayor, Gerard Reid



This Working Paper has received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the organisation, its members, or other organisations supporting the work.



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). For any commercial use please contact publications@clubofrome.org

AI declaration: Claude Opus 4.6 was used in the preparation of this report for the purpose of preparing and finalising diagrams based on published datasets and the paper's risk analysis. All data and references have been fact-checked and verified by the author(s).

Author Bios

Dr Nafeez Ahmed is Executive Director of the Foundation for Civilisation Renewal, Distinguished Fellow at the Schumacher Institute for Sustainable Systems and a Commissioner on the Club of Rome's Earth4All Economics Transformation Commission. He has advised numerous governments and international organisations including the UN on systemic risks and the transition to a post-carbon era. He is also the author of several influential books, including *A User's Guide to the Crisis of Civilization*.

Divyesh Desai is an energy expert with over 30 years of experience. He has held prominent roles at major oil and gas companies, including serving as Business Development Head for New Fuels in Asia at Shell and Head of Marketing at Shell Energy. His expertise lies in navigating complex energy markets, international commercial negotiations, and developing emerging business models that adapt to the realities of climate change and the transition toward low-carbon, sustainable fuels.

Sandrine Dixson-Declève serves as the Global Ambassador for the Club of Rome where she was previously President, and is Executive Co-Chair of Earth4All and the Systems Transformation Hub. With over 35 years of experience advising the UN, the European Commission and governments, she has sat on several Executive and non Executive Boards in the electricity and transport sectors. She was previously Director of the Prince of Wales's Corporate Leaders Group and a special advisor to the Prince on climate change, sustainability and green economic growth. She is also the co-author of *Earth for All: A Survival Guide for Humanity*.

Dr Vicente López-Ibor Mayor is a Spanish lawyer, businessman, and academic specialising in European energy law. A former chairman of European solar energy giant Lightsource BP, he is currently involved in several major Spanish energy companies including Ampere Energy, FF Ventures and Axpo Iberia. He is the President of the European Federation of Energy Law Associations (EFELA) and previously served as a Commissioner of the National Energy Commission and of the National Electric System Commission of Spain, and founding Member of the European Council of Energy Regulators.

Gerard Reid is a leading global authority on the energy transition and mobility, and the Co-founding Partner of the financial services firm Alexa Capital. Drawing on over two decades of experience in investment banking focused on the digital energy revolution, he helps organisations navigate rapid technological and regulatory changes in the sector. He is a member of the World Economic Forum's Future Energy Council and co-hosts the popular industry-leading "Redefining Energy" podcast.

Executive Summary	4
A Structural Crisis	4
Why Default Responses Cannot Close the Gap	5
The Alternative Is Here	5
Action Plan	6
PHASE 1: Next 12 Months - Emergency Stabilisation	6
PHASE 2: By 2030 - Structural Transition	7
PHASE 3: Mid-2030s - System Completion and Superabundance	8
1. Executive Warning	10
2. Why This Crisis Is Structural, Not Temporary	11
3. The Immediate Risk Landscape	13
3.1 Oil and Refined Products	13
3.2 LNG and Gas	14
3.3 Power-Price Pass-Through	15
3.4 Industrial Competitiveness and Inflation	15
3.5 Fiscal Risk	16
3.6 Synchronous Failure	17
4. Why the Default Responses Fail	20
4.1 The Global Production Plateau: The Shale Boom Is Over	20
4.2 North Sea Expansion	22
4.3 LNG Deepening	23
4.4 European Shale and Fracking	24
4.5 Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)	24
4.6 Large Nuclear	25
5. The Electrified Sovereignty Doctrine: Electrify, Renewabilise, Digitalise, Decentralise	26
5.1 Electrify	26
5.2 Renewabilise	27
5.3 Digitalise	28
5.4 Decentralise	28
5.5 The Superabundance Opportunity: From Scarcity to Surplus	28
6. Grid and Market Reform: The Missing Chapter	31
7. Supply Chains, China and the Real Risk	32
8. Time Horizon	34
8.1 Next 12 Months (Emergency Phase)	34
8.2 By 2030 (Structural Transition)	34
8.3 Mid-2030s (System Completion and Superabundance)	34
References	35

Executive Summary

The war on Iran has exposed a fundamental weakness in Europe's energy system. The issue confronting policymakers is no longer simply how to secure enough oil and gas at acceptable prices. The real problem is that Europe's economy remains structurally exposed to a fossil fuel system that is increasingly volatile, geopolitically fragile and economically unstable. The IEA has assessed this as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market - and unlike 2022, this crisis has destroyed physical infrastructure with repair timelines measured in years, not months. Several of its consequences are now locked in regardless of when or how the conflict ends:

- A multi-year LNG supply gap, with Qatar's Ras Laffan capacity offline for three to five years due to manufacturing bottlenecks no amount of capital can accelerate
- A 2026 harvest shortfall and sustained food price inflation, as fertiliser supply disruption arrived at the opening of spring planting season - too late to reverse
- Accelerated permanent deindustrialisation of Europe's energy-intensive sectors, as facilities closing under current cost conditions will not reopen within this policy window
- Pharmaceutical supply chains serving both the UK and EU are under growing stress - with the UK at acute near-term risk, as generic medicines constituting 85 per cent of NHS prescriptions operate on margins that cannot absorb sustained freight cost increases now running 45 per cent above pre-war levels.
- A stagflationary recession in which both fiscal and monetary instruments are simultaneously constrained, leaving households to absorb the full force of compounding energy and food price increases without the cushioning available in 2022

A Structural Crisis

The deeper issue is that Europe remains heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels whose supply is increasingly concentrated, geologically constrained, and exposed to geopolitical disruption. Each crisis produces the same pattern - price spikes, fiscal intervention, economic damage - without addressing the underlying vulnerability. Three converging realities make this structural rather than temporary:

The shale era is ending. US shale has accounted for 90 per cent of global oil supply growth since 2015. The EIA now projects US crude production declining, with shale output peaking around 2027. Key basins outside the Permian are already in decline. The [IEA](#) finds that 90 per cent of annual upstream investment since 2019 has gone merely to offsetting decline in existing fields - not growing supply, but running to stand still.

The world's supply buffer is locked behind the war zone. OPEC holds approximately 5.3 mb/d of spare capacity - but every barrel of it exports through the Strait of Hormuz. The one mechanism the global market has to absorb a supply shock is physically inaccessible because of the very conflict causing the shock.

Net energy returns are collapsing. The Energy Return on Investment (EROI) of the fossil fuel system has been declining for decades. By 2030, the global oil industry is projected to consume approximately 25 per cent of the energy it produces just to keep producing. By 2050, this rises to approximately 50 per cent (Delannoy et al., 2021). This is the thermodynamic reality behind the price volatility and supply fragility policymakers are now confronting. It means that even if this war ends tomorrow, the underlying brittleness of the fossil fuel system will remain and worsen.

Why Default Responses Cannot Close the Gap

Conventional responses cannot deliver meaningful supply within the 2026-2030 emergency window. North Sea licensing-to-production runs 5-10 years and the basin cannot meaningfully alter the UK's supply position within the crisis window. LNG diversification preserves structural price exposure rather than removing it - as Qatar's force majeure has just demonstrated. SMRs remain commercially unproven. Large nuclear has delivered consistent cost escalation and delay across every recent European project - Hinkley Point C, Flamanville 3, Olkiluoto 3 - and cannot be deployed at the speed required. These are not arguments against bounded roles for any of these options. But they show it would be mistaken to anchor an emergency energy security strategy on options that cannot deliver within the timeframe the emergency demands.

The Alternative Is Here

The strategic conclusion is clear. Energy security in the twenty-first century will not be achieved by securing more hydrocarbons but by reducing structural exposure to them. The economic and technical case for this transition is now established beyond reasonable dispute.

Solar PV costs have fallen over 80 per cent since 2010, onshore wind over 45 per cent, batteries almost 90 per cent. Offshore wind CfD strike prices of £37–50/MWh already undercut gas-fired generation at £80–120/MWh. Once installed, these technologies produce electricity at near-zero marginal cost. The energy system therefore shifts from one dominated by volatile fuel costs to one dominated by predictable infrastructure investment.

Critically, the reliability objection is now resolved. The [IEA PVPS Task 16 Firm Power report](#) (February 2026), drawing on over 25 expert modelling teams, confirms that fully renewable firm power systems - delivering guaranteed 24/7 electricity with no fossil fuel backup - are both technically achievable and economically competitive (Perez & Remund, 2026). [RethinkX modelling](#) identifies an optimal UK system producing 8–14 times current electricity output at \$747 per capita per year over 20 years - comparable to current energy expenditure and far less than the cumulative cost of repeated fossil fuel crises (Dorr et al., 2025).

The UK spent over £100 billion on energy support in 2022-2024. The capital to build the alternative is less than the cost of one crisis - and delivers a permanent productive asset rather than temporary fiscal relief.

A structured emergency plan from 12 months to 10 years alongside a phase out of fossil fuel subsidies and windfall profit taxation is the only way forward. EU fossil energy profits are €81.4 million per day. Coupled with €111 billion of subsidies in 2023, this is a fossil fuel life support system that must be immediately severed and instead transferred to a just transition fund that enables European citizens to profit from abundant clean energy.

The opportunity is not simply to replace fossil fuels but to build an energy system capable of producing abundant domestic electricity at stable cost. Countries that move fastest will not only strengthen their energy security but position themselves to capture new industries built around cheap clean electricity. Energy security in the twenty-first century will not be achieved by securing more fuel. It will be achieved by needing far less of it.

Action Plan

The following roadmap is structured around three time horizons. Each action is designed to be implementable within existing institutional frameworks. Emergency-phase actions create the conditions for structural reforms, which in turn unlock the system-completion phase.

PHASE 1: Next 12 Months - Emergency Stabilisation

- 1. Fast-track planning consent for shovel-ready renewable and storage projects.** Invoke energy security powers to accelerate planning approval for wind, solar and battery storage projects that are ready to build. Every month of delay in deploying clean generation is a month of continued exposure to gas-price transmission into household and industrial energy bills.
- 2. Clear grid connection queue backlogs.** Mandate that grid operators process all shovel-ready connection applications within six months. The current multi-year queue is the single largest administrative bottleneck preventing clean generation from reaching consumers. NESO's own connections reform programme acknowledges the scale of the problem; what is needed now is a binding deadline with regulatory penalties for non-compliance.
- 3. Accelerate heat pump, building retrofit and EV charging deployment.** Every heat pump installed permanently removes a household from gas-price exposure. Every EV charged from domestic renewables reduces oil import dependency. Critically, rebalance policy levies so that electricity bills no longer carry a disproportionate share of network charges relative to gas - this levy distortion currently makes heat pumps appear more expensive to run than gas boilers despite being three to four times more thermally efficient.
- 4. Begin formal re-regulation of power markets.** Set a binding three-year deadline to decouple electricity prices from gas-price setting. Europe's marginal pricing system means the most expensive generator - almost always gas - sets the price for the entire market, even when the majority of power comes from cheaper renewables. This is a market design flaw, not an energy supply problem. Breaking this link is the single most effective measure to reduce

household and industrial energy costs and shield them from future fossil fuel shocks. Give Transmission System Operators a parallel three-year deadline to reform curtailment management, with regulatory penalties for avoidable delay. The UK paid nearly £1.5 billion in curtailment costs in 2025 - paying wind farms to switch off and gas plants to replace them.

5. Tax windfall profits made by oil and gas majors. Use windfall profit taxation on oil and gas companies to support just transition funds which can help alleviate effects on citizens and finance the transition away from fossil fuels.

PHASE 2: By 2030 - Structural Transition

1. Complete the decoupling of electricity prices from gas prices. This is the single most important structural reform. Until it is complete, every fossil fuel shock will transmit directly into UK and European household bills regardless of how much clean generation is on the system.

2. Scale wind, solar and battery storage to NESO Clean Power 2030 and REPowerEU targets - treating these as deployment floors, not ceilings. The security case for overshooting existing targets is now overwhelming. Offshore wind CfDs already deliver electricity at half the cost of gas-fired generation. Every gigawatt of clean capacity deployed is a permanent reduction in fossil fuel exposure. The CfD mechanism is proven, understood by capital markets, and scalable without new institutions or technology - it requires only political commitment to expand its scope and funding envelope.

3. Build interconnection, long-duration storage and flexible demand infrastructure. The UK operates as an effective energy island: interconnection capacity of approximately 8–10 GW against peak demand of 30–40 GW. Unlike Continental Europe, the UK cannot draw on surplus renewable power from neighbours during shortfalls. Building cross-border interconnection, long-duration storage and demand flexibility is essential to create the system resilience that a clean grid requires.

4. Reorient public and institutional capital toward domestic clean energy assets. UK pension funds manage over £2.5 trillion - the largest institutional capital pool in Europe. These funds require long-duration, inflation-linked, stable-return assets. Renewable infrastructure is precisely this asset class, yet UK pension capital remains systematically underweight in domestic clean energy while holding fossil fuel exposure. The Financial Conduct Authority and The Pensions Regulator have the tools to address this through fiduciary guidance and reformed incentive frameworks.

5. Establish domestic and allied-nation manufacturing capacity. Build UK and European manufacturing for solar panels, batteries and critical mineral processing to reduce single-supplier exposure. The supply chain risk of renewables is fundamentally different from fossil fuel dependence: it is front-loaded (concentrated in the manufacturing phase), industrially changeable (solar panels can be manufactured in Europe; Saudi oil cannot), and declining as domestic capacity scales. Wind turbine supply chains are already strategically sovereign - Siemens Gamesa and Vestas hold approximately 40 per cent of the global offshore market.

AUKUS and bilateral agreements with Australia provide preferential access to lithium and rare earths. EU-India partnerships open access to India's rapidly scaling solar manufacturing.

6. Align UK-EU market reform, grid standards and supply-chain strategy. Create a unified energy security and trans-continental energy sharing architecture. The strategic prize is a UK-European clean energy system that can share surplus generation across borders, balance intermittency at continental scale, and present a unified industrial strategy to compete with China's scale advantages.

7. Penalise grid operators for avoidable curtailment and bottleneck behaviour. Under current UK rules, TSOs pay curtailment costs in year one but only a third in year two - creating perverse incentives that delay reform. Battery storage should be built where grid constraints are worst. Regulators should fine grid operators for avoidable bottleneck behaviour rather than rewarding passive asset management. Enable decentralised battery storage in homes, vehicles and industrial sites as standard grid infrastructure.

PHASE 3: Mid-2030s - System Completion and Superabundance

1. Complete the transition to a distributed, digitally managed, storage-rich clean power system. The strategic destination is an energy system in which the vast majority of power, heat and transport runs on domestically generated clean electricity. Domestic energy costs become a function of infrastructure investment and technology cost curves, structurally decoupled from global commodity volatility. The UK and Europe become energy exporters in technological capability and industrial output, rather than fuel importers exposed to contested supply routes.

2. Build toward the superabundant energy system. RethinkX modelling identifies an optimal UK system of 223 GW solar and 479 GW wind with 8,431 GWh of battery storage, generating 8–14 times current output. The surplus energy above baseload requirements is not waste - it is the foundation of a new industrial strategy. Near-zero marginal cost electricity at scale enables green hydrogen production, e-fuel synthesis for aviation and shipping, ammonia production for fertilisers, electric arc furnace steelmaking, desalination, and data centre operations. Countries that build surplus clean capacity first will capture these industries; those that do not will import their products.

3. Reduce fossil fuel use to residual industrial applications on defined phase-out schedules. Large nuclear contributes where already under construction but does not anchor the strategy. No new-build nuclear dependency. Fossil fuel use is confined to residual applications with clear, time-bound phase-out trajectories.

Energy security now means accelerated electrified sovereignty.

1. Executive Warning

The old energy-security doctrine has failed. The issue confronting UK and European leaders is no longer how to secure enough hydrocarbons at acceptable prices. It is how to reduce structural exposure to hydrocarbons before the next geopolitical rupture produces deeper industrial, fiscal and social damage than the last.

The US-Israeli war on Iran, launched on 28 February 2026, has produced what the [International Energy Agency \(IEA\)](#) describes as "the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market" (IEA, 2026). Crude and product flows through the Strait of Hormuz - through which approximately 20 per cent of all globally traded petroleum transits - have plunged to what the IEA calls "a trickle." Global oil supply was projected to fall by 8 million barrels per day in March 2026. Brent crude futures have traded within reach of \$120 per barrel, their highest level since 2022 (IEA, 2026).

What began as a price shock has become a structural supply destruction event. Iranian missile strikes on Qatar's Ras Laffan complex on 18-19 March destroyed infrastructure that will take three to five years to repair, because the specialist components required do not exist in sufficient quantity anywhere in the world. Unlike 2022, which was a rerouting problem, this crisis has physically destroyed production capacity that cannot be restored within the policy window this paper addresses. The supply gap is locked in regardless of when the conflict ends.

The consequences now in train extend far beyond energy prices. The same shock that has removed LNG from European markets has simultaneously disrupted the fertiliser supply on which this year's harvest depends, the petrochemical feedstocks on which European industry runs, and the pharmaceutical supply chains on which healthcare systems rely.

The UK enters this as the worst-positioned major economy in the G20. In the EU, France and Italy carry sovereign debt at 112 and 137 per cent of GDP, and face a self-reinforcing spiral in which ECB tightening to control inflation raises their borrowing costs, narrows fiscal space to protect populations, and generates the political conditions that make coherent long-horizon response hardest to sustain. In any scenario the bloc faces a stagflationary shock. The question before UK and European policymakers, therefore, is how to respond to the permanent elevation of structural costs across every system simultaneously - with the institutional tools to do so already depleted by the last crisis.

It is important to recognise that the Iran war has only exposed a pre-existing vulnerability. The underlying problem is structural fossil fuel dependence in a world of worsening geopolitical chokepoints, declining net-energy returns and power markets still too exposed to gas-price transmission. The policy response must shift from "secure more hydrocarbons" to "shrink hydrocarbon exposure as fast as possible."

The strategic implications are unavoidable: energy security now means accelerated electrified sovereignty through technologies that are not dependent on fossil fuel markets and supply chains.

2. Why This Crisis Is Structural, Not Temporary

Policymakers may be tempted to treat this as another one-off price shock, comparable to the 2022 disruption following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. That framing is dangerously inadequate. The fossil fuel energy system has become structurally brittle. Geopolitical chokepoints, declining energy returns, supply concentration and fossil fuel-linked inflation now reinforce one another in a self-amplifying cycle of instability.

The systems science behind this diagnosis is well-established. Complex living systems, including at the scale of industrial civilisation, move through phases of growth, conservation, release and reorganisation. During the conservation phase, a system becomes highly optimised but increasingly rigid: efficient at exploiting familiar conditions, but progressively unable to absorb shocks. When the environment shifts, the system enters a "release phase" in which accumulated structures break down. **What is informally called the "polycrisis" - the convergence of climate, energy, economic, geopolitical and social stresses - is best understood as the symptom of the incumbent energy-industrial system entering this release phase** (Ahmed, 2024).


The empirical evidence is unambiguous:

Declining energy returns. The Energy Return on Investment (EROI) of fossil fuels - the ratio of energy extracted to energy invested in extraction - has been declining for decades. **Global fossil fuel EROI peaked around the 1960s at approximately 44:1 and has since roughly halved** (Court & Fizaine, 2017). A 2019 study published in *Nature Energy* found that when measured at the point of final energy use rather than at the wellhead, fossil fuel EROI is approximately 6:1 and falling (Brockway et al., 2019). Declining EROI translates into rising systemic instability, global conflict and heightened risk of state-failure (Ahmed, 2017). By 2030, the global oil industry is projected to consume approximately 25 per cent of the energy it produces simply to sustain production; by 2050, this figure approaches 50 per cent (Delannoy et al., 2021).

The fossil fuel system is consuming an ever-larger share of its own output to keep functioning.

In contrast, a harmonised review of the EROI literature confirms that solar PV, wind and hydropower now return 10:1 or above at point of use under consistent methodological boundaries, while petroleum oil falls notably below that threshold (Murphy et al., 2022).

The energy crossover: fossil EROI decline meets renewable EROI rise



Sources: Court & Fizaine (2017), Brockway et al. (2019), Delannoy et al. (2021), Ahmed (2024). Solar EROI trajectory based on emerging consensus among EROI researchers.


Geopolitical chokepoint concentration. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that more than three-quarters of the world's oil supply travels by sea through a handful of critical chokepoints with no easy transit alternatives. The current crisis demonstrates that the Strait of Hormuz alone can be rendered impassable by relatively low-cost asymmetric means - drones, mines and GPS jamming - at a cost of billions to the global economy. Over 500 ballistic missiles and nearly 2,000 drones have been fired by Iran since the conflict began. The implication is that Iran, not the US with its conventional arsenal, controls the timeline of the war.

Structural economic drag. The long-term decline in fossil fuel EROI is directly connected to the secular decline in the rate of global economic growth since the 1970s, a relationship masked by decades of financialisation and debt expansion (Ahmed, 2024; Hall, 2017). Capital Economics projects eurozone GDP growth slowing to just 0.5 per cent year-on-year in the second half of 2026 if the conflict persists. Morgan Stanley warns that a potential energy-supply shock "could box in the Fed" and put upward pressure on long-term bond yields. Periodic crises - 2008, 2020, 2022 and now 2026 - are features of this structural process, each one larger and harder to absorb. The risk of stagflation - simultaneous rising inflation and unemployment - is now material.

Repeated shocks should not be viewed as anomalous. They are the defining behaviour of a system whose operating conditions have fundamentally changed. Policy designed for a world of abundant, cheap, high-return fossil energy is policy designed for a world that no longer exists.

3. The Immediate Risk Landscape

The Iran conflict has created five distinct but interconnected transmission channels through which fossil fuel disruption damages UK and European economies.



3.1 Oil and Refined Products

The 2026 energy crisis is a permanent ‘demand destruction’ problem, rather than simply a rerouting issue.

Iranian strikes have damaged or shut dozens of facilities across the region: Qatar's Ras Laffan complex, Saudi Aramco's Ras Tanura refinery, Kuwait's Mina Abdullah refinery with output cut by at least half, Bahrain's Bapco Sitra refinery with force majeure declared, the UAE's Ruwais refinery, and Israel's strikes on Iran's Asaluyeh complex damaging four South Pars processing facilities (Bloomberg, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2026). Rystad Energy estimates total infrastructure repair costs at a minimum of \$25 billion, rising (Martinsen, 2026). Global oil supply fell by

approximately 8 million barrels per day in March alone (IEA, 2026). The Gulf's contribution to global petrochemical feedstocks - more than four million barrels per day equivalent, roughly one quarter of the entire global petrochemicals market - has been severely disrupted (IEA, 2026c).

The large-frame gas turbines required to restore LNG refrigeration compression are produced by only three manufacturers globally, all carrying order backlogs of two to four years driven by data centre demand (Martinsen, 2026). This cannot be accelerated by investment. The physical mechanics of LNG infrastructure compound the problem further: cooling and restarting cryogenic facilities requires weeks of controlled temperature management; restarting oil fields that have been fully shut-in requires months of reservoir pressure stabilisation. Several facilities that were structurally undamaged have still been taken offline because regional storage is full and exports through a closed strait are impossible. Full Gulf production restoration - assuming a ceasefire - is a multi-year process.

The practical consequence for the UK and Europe is sustained energy supply crunch and structurally elevated prices through the late 2020s *regardless of when the conflict ends*. This is a physical supply constraint embedded in the cost structure of every energy-dependent sector for the duration of the policy window this paper addresses. Energy certification body DNV has assessed that even when physical infrastructure eventually restores, "restoring trust will take longer" - meaning war-risk insurance premiums and shipping risk discounts will impose a persistent cost floor on every commodity transiting Hormuz (DNV, 2026). The IEA has described this as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market (IEA, 2026). The question for UK and European policymakers is how to operate across a multi-year period in which the fossil fuel system's costs and instabilities are structurally higher than at any point in the post-war era.

3.2 LNG and Gas

The most consequential single act of infrastructure destruction in the conflict was the Iranian missile strike on Qatar's Ras Laffan Industrial City on 18-19 March 2026. The strikes destroyed LNG production Trains 4 and 6, removing 17 per cent of Qatar's total export capacity for three to five years, with long-term force majeure declared on contracts with European and Asian buyers (QatarEnergy, 2026). Qatar's planned LNG expansion - six additional trains due online by 2027 that importers had incorporated into supply planning - now faces indefinite delay. European gas prices have approximately doubled. UK next-month gas is trading at around 135p per therm, up 69 per cent in 30 days.

The food system consequences are as serious as the energy consequences and less well understood. Qatar's QAFCO - the world's largest single urea producer - halted all production immediately after the LNG shutdown. The Gulf as a whole supplies approximately 46 per cent of internationally traded urea, around half of globally traded sulphur, and significant volumes of ammonia and phosphate (IFPRI, 2026). Urea prices have surged approximately 50 per cent, ammonia by 20 per cent (CNBC, 2026). Approximately 30 per cent of global urea trade has been restricted (CRU Group, 2026). China has restricted fertiliser exports to protect domestic

supply; Russia is at capacity; no comparable alternative exists at the speed required (PBS NewsHour, 2026).

The disruption arrived at the opening of the Northern Hemisphere spring planting season. Farmers applying reduced nitrogen this spring will harvest reduced yields this autumn. The food price consequences reach consumers in winter 2026 and through 2027 - arriving simultaneously with the energy bill increases feeding through from July. This sequencing is now inevitable. Even a ceasefire tomorrow cannot undo the fertiliser that was not applied in March and April. University of Bonn economist Martin Qaim assesses that if fertiliser prices hold at current levels, global food prices could rise by 20-30 per cent (ZME Science, 2026). The former chief executive of the UK's Food and Drink Federation forecasts UK food price rises of 5 per cent within three months and 7-8 per cent with emerging product shortages by September (Food Manufacture, 2026). For lower-income households already facing sharply higher energy bills, a simultaneous food price shock of this scale represents a cost-of-living crisis significantly worse than 2022 - under governments with significantly less fiscal capacity to respond.

3.3 Power-Price Pass-Through

The most damaging transmission mechanism for household and industrial consumers is the link between wholesale gas prices and electricity bills. Europe's marginal pricing system means that gas-fired generation sets the price for the entire electricity market, even when the majority of power comes from cheaper renewables. The [European Commission](#) has acknowledged this structural flaw (European Commission, 2026). The UK paid nearly £1.5 billion in curtailment costs in 2025 alone - paying wind farms to switch off and gas plants to replace them. This is a market design problem, rather than an energy supply problem. The UK's energy system links the cost of gas to electricity prices because the grid still relies on gas-fired power stations, meaning global price shocks translate directly into higher domestic energy costs.

The UK's exposure to this mechanism is structurally more acute than that of most EU member states. Unlike Continental Europe, the UK operates as an effective energy island: interconnection capacity with neighboring grids stands at approximately 8-10 GW against domestic peak demand of 30-40 GW. The UK cannot draw on surplus renewable power from France, the Netherlands or Scandinavia during periods of domestic shortfall, nor can it export excess wind generation during periods of surplus without accepting curtailment losses. This physical isolation means that gas-price shocks land with full force on UK consumers, with no cross-border buffering available. Every unit of offshore wind that remains unconnected to the domestic grid due to queue backlogs therefore represents not just wasted generation but a direct and quantifiable addition to household and industrial energy bills (National Grid ESO, 2025).

3.4 Industrial Competitiveness and Inflation

The war is accelerating the collapse of Europe's industrial sector which was already failing under energy costs it could not sustain. Before the conflict began, UK chemical output had fallen 30 per cent from 2019; Germany's 18 per cent; France's 12 per cent (Oxford Economics, 2025).

European gas prices were running three to four times higher than in the United States. At least ten petrochemical crackers had closed or been announced for closure across Europe since 2022 (Chemistry World, 2025). Three-quarters of energy-intensive German companies were already shifting investment abroad (Simon-Kucher, 2025).

The war has now made the commercial case for remaining in European energy-intensive production impossible across a wide range of sectors. Chemicals provide the feedstocks for food packaging, agricultural films, pharmaceuticals, vehicle components and construction materials. Steel goes into infrastructure, defence equipment and manufacturing. Glass, ceramics and paper are ubiquitous inputs across consumer and industrial supply chains. When these sectors contract in Europe, the contraction propagates systemically through every downstream industry that depends on their outputs.

Facilities that close under current cost structures will be unlikely to reopen. The investment required to restart a shut ethylene cracker or ammonia plant is not commercially viable at European energy prices that were already uncompetitive before the war and are now even higher. The UK's last major ethylene cracker at Grangemouth is already on government life support. Once it closes, the UK has no domestic polymer production of scale. Germany's ammonia capacity - the foundation of domestic fertiliser production - is being curtailed now and will not be rebuilt while gas prices remain at current levels.

The deindustrialisation that economic forecasters have been projecting as a decade-long risk is being compressed into a two-to-three year reality. The sectors most exposed - energy-intensive chemicals, fertiliser production, steel, specialist glass and ceramics - will not return to European production at meaningful scale within the 2026-2030 policy window. Their permanent loss accelerates import dependence, reduces the tax base, destroys skilled employment, and removes the industrial substrate on which any future clean energy manufacturing strategy would need to build.

3.5 Fiscal Risk

The UK government spent over £100 billion supporting households through the 2022 energy crisis. It cannot do the same again at the same scale. The fiscal headroom that existed in 2022 has been consumed, and the government's borrowing costs are rising rather than falling because interest rates are going up, not down.

In a normal recession, the Bank of England would cut interest rates: cheaper borrowing stimulates spending, supports employment, and softens the downturn. It cannot do this now because inflation is accelerating - forecast at 4 per cent for 2026, potentially above 5 per cent under sustained disruption (OECD, 2026; Oxford Economics, 2026). Cutting rates when inflation is rising would make prices rise faster. But raising rates to control inflation - which markets now price as likely - pushes up mortgage costs for millions of households already absorbing higher energy and food bills, deepens the economic contraction, and increases unemployment. There is no good option. The instrument that normally softens downturns is instead adding to household financial stress.

For the EU, the same intractability exists but with additional danger. France carries government debt at 112 per cent of GDP; Italy at 137 per cent; Greece at 163 per cent (ECB, 2024). These countries need to borrow to fund energy support for their populations. But rising interest rates mean their borrowing costs are increasing. The more they borrow, the more they pay in interest, the wider their deficits, the more markets worry about whether they can repay, the higher the interest rate demanded - a spiral that, if it reaches sufficient velocity, becomes self-fulfilling.

This is precisely the dynamic that nearly broke the eurozone in 2010-2015. Eurozone government bonds are currently experiencing their worst month in a decade (Financial Times, as cited in Pravda EU, 2026). EU Commissioner Dombrovskis has stated that in any scenario the bloc faces a stagflationary shock, with growth cut by up to 0.6 percentage points in both 2026 and 2027 in a prolonged conflict (EU Commission, 2026). The ECB, like the Bank of England, faces a version of the same impossible choice: tighten to control inflation and risk fracturing sovereign debt markets in the bloc's most indebted economies, or hold and allow inflation to embed. The fiscal space to cushion the shock nationally is narrowest in precisely the countries where the shock lands hardest.

The combined result is that both instruments that absorbed the 2022 shock - government borrowing to subsidise bills, and central bank rate cuts to soften the recession - are simultaneously unavailable in 2026. Households absorb the cost directly. For lower-income households, who spend the highest share of income on energy and food and carry the least savings buffer, there is no institutional cushion. The question is not whether living standards fall. It is how far, and for how long, without one.

3.6 Synchronous Failure

In 2002, systems analyst Thomas Homer-Dixon used an Israel-Iran war closing the Strait of Hormuz as his worked example of synchronous failure - the condition in which multiple stresses building separately beneath the surface of a complex society are simultaneously activated by a single trigger, producing cascades no individual system can absorb (Homer-Dixon, 2002). That scenario has now materialised. The framework Homer-Dixon developed with Walker, Rockström and colleagues identifies three levels at which such crises operate: within individual systems; across multiple systems simultaneously; and then propagating outward across wider societal boundaries (Homer-Dixon et al., 2015). All three levels are now active.

The within-system stresses were already present. They were the product of a fossil fuel system that had become, as Ahmed's planetary phase shift analysis documents, maximally optimised and therefore maximally brittle (Ahmed, 2024): UK chemical output already down 30 per cent from 2019; NHS pharmaceutical buffers measured in weeks; household savings depleted by the 2022 crisis; European sovereign debt at post-2015 highs.

Homer-Dixon identifies the underlying mechanism: complex societies sustain their institutional complexity through flows of high-quality energy; as EROI declines, that sustaining capacity

shrinks and the system becomes progressively more fragile (Homer-Dixon, 2011). The war has activated this fragility.

Homer-Dixon's framework identifies breakdown as occurring when the load on a system exceeds its flexibility and buffering capacity. In 2022, load was high but both held: governments could borrow, central banks could ease, households had savings, industrial capacity was intact. The system bent. In 2026, load is materially higher across every channel simultaneously while flexibility is lower and every buffer is simultaneously depleted. The arithmetic is not metaphorical.

The cross-system dimension is where 2026 becomes qualitatively different from any previous shock. The interactions are multiplicative and mutually self-reinforcing. The fiscal-monetary lock, in which the government cannot borrow at scale and the central bank cannot ease at the same time, removes the fundamental redundancy of macroeconomic stabilisation: the two instruments that normally compensate for each other's constraints are both disabled by the same shock. The industrial-pharmaceutical cascade means that the same petrochemical feedstock disruption accelerating European deindustrialisation is simultaneously degrading pharmaceutical supply chains. Most corrosively, the food-fiscal-political bind means that fiscal incapacity to cushion the food and energy price shock generates the very political conditions - short-termism, fragmented mandates, demands for immediate relief over long-horizon strategy - that make coherent structural response hardest to sustain. Each system's failure degrades the environment in which the others must operate.

The EU adds a further interaction absent in the UK. The ECB's dilemma - in which raising rates to control inflation actively worsens the fiscal position of the member states most exposed to the shock - creates a worsening spiral. France at 112 per cent debt-to-GDP, Italy at 137 per cent, Greece at 163 per cent are nodes in a system where rate decisions transmit into borrowing costs, which transmit into fiscal capacity, which transmit into political stability, which transmit back into bond markets. Homer-Dixon et al. identify this pattern - in which the institutional response to crisis propagates the crisis further - as a defining feature of synchronous failure. The 2010-2015 eurozone sovereign debt crisis demonstrated that this loop can threaten the monetary union's cohesion. It is now being reactivated under conditions worse on every relevant metric.

A final mechanism compounds all of the above. Homer-Dixon's ingenuity gap identifies that as problems become more complex and simultaneous, they require more institutional capacity - political coherence, resource slack, social trust - to manage. But those are precisely the conditions that simultaneous crises erode: trust falls when institutions visibly fail to protect living standards; resource slack is consumed by emergency responses; political coherence fragments under the distributional pressures that energy and food shocks generate. The gap between the scale of what is unfolding and the capacity available to respond therefore widens the longer the stresses persist (Homer-Dixon, 2000).

The UK faces four compounding outcomes within the 2026-2030 window. First, a stagflationary recession in which neither fiscal nor monetary policy provides the relief it provided in 2022: households absorb the full force of energy and food price increases without the emergency support programmes that cushioned the previous crisis.

Second, NHS pharmaceutical rationing for patients with chronic conditions - cardiovascular, diabetic, psychiatric - within months of sustained supply-chain disruption, as generic medicines on razor-thin margins cease to be commercially viable to supply at current costs; these are the daily medications on which millions depend.

Third, permanent loss of industrial capacity across chemicals, steel, glass and agricultural inputs that does not return within this policy window, removing the employment and tax base that would otherwise fund recovery.

Fourth, a second severe cost-of-living crisis landing on a population with lower savings, higher mortgage costs, less institutional trust and a government with fewer available tools than in 2022 - creating the political conditions in which the long-horizon investment this situation demands becomes progressively harder to sustain.

The EU faces the same trajectory, compounded by the realistic probability that sustained stagflation under ECB tightening pushes French and Italian sovereign debt dynamics toward the self-reinforcing spiral that forced near-catastrophic intervention in 2012.

The situation now confronting UK and European policymakers is that a single chokepoint failure has exposed a converging architecture of systemic crisis. The question is whether the analysis of that architecture produces a response adequate to its actual character - or whether each transmission channel is again managed in isolation, consuming institutional capacity without addressing the system that produced them.

4. Why the Default Responses Fail

The standard fossil fuel-era response to an energy shock is to produce more hydrocarbons. This instinct is now running into geological, economic and temporal constraints that make it structurally inadequate. It is essential to understand the supply context in which this crisis is occurring.


4.1 The Global Production Plateau: The Shale Boom Is Over

The United States has been the world's swing producer for the past decade. From 2015 to 2024, the US accounted for 90 per cent of the increase in global oil supply, with the shale boom lifting US production by more than 8 million barrels per day (mb/d) to over 20 mb/d (IEA, 2025a). That era is ending.

The [US Energy Information Administration \(EIA\)](#) forecasts that US crude oil production will average 13.5 mb/d in 2026 - approximately 100,000 b/d less than in 2025, marking the first sustained decline after four consecutive years of rising output (EIA, 2025). The EIA's June 2025 Short-Term Energy Outlook was more explicit: US crude production is projected to slip from a record 13.5 mb/d in Q2 2025 to approximately 13.3 mb/d by end-2026. Active drilling rigs have fallen to 442, the lowest since November 2021, with Permian Basin rigs down 12 per cent year-on-year. Shale operators including Diamondback Energy have publicly stated that production has already peaked. The EIA's March 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook concedes that the higher oil price spikes - triggered by the conflict - will permit crude oil production to rise to 13.8 million b/d in 2027.

However, contextualised against the EIA's longer-term assessment, this will likely only offset a steeper decline. The EIA projects that US shale oil production will peak at approximately 10 mb/d around 2027, then decline to approximately 9.3 mb/d by 2050. Key shale basins outside the Permian - including the Eagle Ford and Bakken - are expected to decline due to reduced drilling activity and natural depletion. Drilled-but-uncompleted wells (DUCs) have fallen to their lowest level since tracking began in 2013, meaning the industry has exhausted the backlog that previously allowed rapid supply responses. As the IEA's *Oil 2025* medium-term report concludes, "the pace of expansion in US oil production is slowing as oil companies scale back investments" (IEA, 2025a).

US crude oil production: the shale boom peaks and declines




Source: US Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook (June 2025). The US accounted for 90% of global oil supply growth 2015–2024 (IEA, 2025).

This pattern is not confined to the United States. A new IEA study, [The Implications of Oil and Gas Field Decline Rates](#), finds that nearly 90 per cent of annual upstream oil and gas investment since 2019 has been dedicated to offsetting production declines rather than meeting demand growth (IEA, 2025b). If investment in tight oil and shale gas were to stop, production would decline by more than 35 per cent within 12 months. Under natural decline rates, the IEA finds that advanced economies would face a 65 per cent drop in production over the next decade, with supply becoming increasingly concentrated among a small number of Middle Eastern and Russian producers - precisely the producers now at the centre of the current geopolitical crisis.

Production is declining or plateauing across multiple major producers. UK crude oil production fell 9 per cent in 2024. Mexico's output declined 6 per cent in the same year, representing the biggest decline globally in crude capacity to 2030 according to the IEA. Nigeria's crude production has fallen approximately 31 per cent since 2015 due to mature fields, ageing infrastructure and persistent disruption. European crude production as a whole declined 3 per cent in 2024 (Enerdata, 2025). The IEA's medium-term outlook projects that global oil demand will reach a plateau around 105.5 mb/d by the end of the decade, with demand from combustible fossil fuels potentially peaking as early as 2027 (IEA, 2025a).

The implications for UK and European policymakers are stark. The world is entering a structural phase in which the fossil fuel supply base is contracting in net-energy terms; military conflict over remaining concentrated fossil fuel reserves is intensifying; and the costs, prices, volatility and systemic instability associated with fossil fuel dependence

will increase - potentially on an accelerating curve. Each of the conventional responses to the current crisis must be assessed against this backdrop.



The spare capacity trap: The IEA estimates OPEC holds ~5.3 mb/d of spare capacity — of which 3.1 mb/d is Saudi Arabia, 1.1 mb/d the UAE, 0.6 mb/d Iraq, and 0.4 mb/d Kuwait. All four producers export through the Strait of Hormuz, which the Iran war has effectively closed. Spare capacity exists on paper but is physically stranded behind the chokepoint. Meanwhile, non-OPEC+ growth producers (US, Brazil, Canada, Guyana) are peaking or slowing. The IEA projects non-OPEC+ capacity growth contracts after 2029 as the pipeline of new projects thins.

Sources: EIA AEO2025 reference case (US to 2050); IEA Oil 2025 (capacity forecasts to 2030: UAE +720 kb/d, Iraq +560 kb/d; Mexico biggest decline); IEA field decline rates study 2025; IEA STEO March 2026; EIA country data; Enerdata 2025. Saudi production shown at actual output levels, not full capacity. Projections after 2026 are illustrative based on IEA/EIA trajectory guidance and published capacity plans.

4.2 North Sea Expansion

New North Sea licensing will not produce meaningful volumes within the 2026–2030 emergency window. Development timelines from licensing to first production typically run five to ten years or longer. UK crude oil production fell 9 per cent in 2024 alone, and the [DESNZ Energy Trends December 2025](#) report shows the North Sea is a mature, high-cost basin with declining output. As the DESNZ [gas security of supply consultation](#) acknowledges, the UK's North Sea gas basin "will be unable to meet domestic demand within the next few years" (DESNZ, 2025). Net-energy returns from these fields are declining: progressively more capital and energy input is required per unit of output, consistent with the EROI trajectory documented in Section 2. Critically, most North Sea oil and gas is sold on international markets at global prices - a point acknowledged

by the UK government's own [Energy Security Strategy](#). Domestic production does not translate into lower domestic bills. Additional drilling risks locking capital into assets that conflict with demand-destruction trajectories and climate commitments, creating stranded-asset exposure for investors and taxpayers alike.

The capital allocation evidence substantiates this. Shell divested approximately \$3.8 billion of North Sea assets between 2022 and 2025. BP has reduced its North Sea capital allocation by around 40 per cent. Equinor is redirecting capital toward Norwegian offshore wind. These are internal rate of return decisions. New North Sea developments are delivering IRRs of approximately 8-10 per cent, against 12-18 per cent available from offshore wind projects supported by Contracts for Difference. Capital follows returns; it is leaving the North Sea precisely because proven alternatives offer superior risk-adjusted performance. A field sanctioned today begins production in 2030-2032 and requires 15-20 years of operation to recover capital requiring elevated gas demand through 2045-2050, directly contradicting the structural demand trajectory that capital markets are already pricing forward (Wood Mackenzie, 2025).

There is a further dimension that reframes the North Sea debate entirely. The basin is transitioning. The same geographic feature that made the United Kingdom hydrocarbon-rich - the windiest sustained maritime corridor in the Northern Hemisphere, with average offshore wind speeds of 9-10 meters per second across large areas - makes it among the richest wind resources on Earth. The UK has deployed approximately 30 GW of offshore wind against a technically available offshore resource estimated at over 1,000 GW (Carbon Trust, 2023): roughly 3 per cent of what is available.

The engineering expertise, subsea infrastructure competencies, regulatory frameworks for offshore licensing and supply chain relationships built over four decades of North Sea hydrocarbon development are directly applicable to offshore wind. The strategic question for UK policymakers is whether to double-down on a rapidly collapsing industry in the North Sea or to instead direct its institutional inheritance toward its highest-value future use.

4.3 LNG Deepening

Greater LNG import capacity provides supplier diversification but not structural security. It preserves import dependence, price volatility, shipping risk and exposure to global competition for cargoes. The current crisis demonstrates that LNG supply can be disrupted at source - Qatar's force majeure has removed a fifth of global supply from the market at a stroke.

US natural gas demand is rising due to increasing LNG exports, forecast to be up 50 per cent by 2027 compared to 2024, tightening the global market and connecting domestic prices to international volatility. Moreover, the cheapest US natural gas basins are pipeline-constrained, with new incremental supply coming from deeper and more expensive formations such as Haynesville, with nearly double the breakeven costs compared to other basins (Chatham House, 2026). LNG is a hedge against a specific supplier, not a hedge against the structural vulnerability of fossil fuel dependence itself. The mature North Sea basin will be unable to meet

domestic gas demand within a few years, meaning the UK's reliance on imported gas will only increase - deepening exposure to exactly the kind of shock now underway.

In addition to above, two further dimensions of the LNG dependency warrant explicit attention from UK policymakers. First, the supply security of US LNG accounting for approximately 45 per cent of UK LNG imports rests on an assumption that Asian spot prices remain sufficiently low that US exporters prefer European buyers. This is not guaranteed under most current contract terms: when Asian demand spikes, cargoes redirect. This occurred repeatedly during 2020-2022. Meanwhile, Qatari LNG, approximately 25 per cent of UK imports transits the Strait of Hormuz: the same chokepoint now constraining global oil supply. The current crisis therefore exposes a compounding vulnerability in which the UK's two largest LNG suppliers are simultaneously exposed to the same geopolitical rupture, one through its export route, one through its production facility. Qatar's force majeure declaration of 4 March 2026 makes this concrete rather than theoretical.

Second, there is a significant capital allocation dimension that policymakers have not yet confronted. UK pension funds manage in excess of £2.5 trillion in assets - the largest institutional capital pool in Europe. These funds require long-duration, inflation-linked, stable-return assets to match their liability profiles. Renewable infrastructure of offshore wind, grid assets, solar is precisely this asset class. Yet UK pension capital remains systematically underweight in domestic clean energy assets, while simultaneously holding fossil fuel exposure through listed equity in major oil and gas companies. British savers are in effect financing the energy system that is making British households poorer. This is a capital allocation inefficiency of considerable scale, and one that policymakers, the Financial Conduct Authority and The Pensions Regulator have the tools to address through fiduciary guidance and reformed incentive frameworks (IPPR, 2024).

4.4 European Shale and Fracking

European geology is substantially less favourable than North American shale basins. The UK's experience with exploratory fracking at Preston New Road in Lancashire demonstrated both community opposition and poor geological results. Poland, often cited as Europe's most promising shale prospect, saw major international operators withdraw after exploration drilling failed to produce commercial flows. Timelines to meaningful production would be measured in decades, not years. Political feasibility is weak across most European jurisdictions. The IEA's own decline rate analysis underscores the fundamental fragility of shale production even where geology is favourable - if investment stops, output collapses by over a third within a year (IEA, 2025b). Pursuing shale in Europe is not a serious near-term option under any realistic assessment.

4.5 Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)

SMRs remain commercially unproven at scale. While several designs are in advanced development - including Rolls-Royce SMR in the UK and NuScale in the US (the latter having seen its first US project cancelled on cost grounds in 2023) - no design has been deployed

commercially at the scale required to contribute meaningfully to grid supply. Cost trajectories remain deeply uncertain: the UK government's own assessment places first-of-a-kind SMR costs at well above current onshore wind or solar. Licensing and construction timelines extend well beyond the 2026–2030 emergency window. SMRs may eventually contribute to the energy mix as a bounded complement, but they are irrelevant to the crisis now confronting policymakers.


4.6 Large Nuclear

Large nuclear is more credible than SMRs as a known technology, but the recent track record offers little comfort on cost or timeline. Hinkley Point C in the UK has seen its cost estimate rise from £18 billion to over £46 billion, with completion now delayed to 2031 at the earliest. Flamanville 3 in France was delivered more than a decade late and vastly over budget. Olkiluoto 3 in Finland experienced similar delays. These are consistent patterns in large nuclear construction in liberalised economies, as opposed to isolated failures. Large nuclear may serve as mid-2030s strategic insurance where projects are already underway, but it cannot be the primary answer to the current crisis window, and new-build decisions taken today would not deliver power until the late 2030s at the earliest.

5. The Electrified Sovereignty Doctrine: Electrify, Renewabilise, Digitalise, Decentralise

Energy security now depends on building a distributed, storage-rich, digitally managed clean power system that steadily removes oil and gas from power, heat, transport and as much industry as possible. This is a national-security and economic-resilience imperative.

The underlying economics are decisive. Solar photovoltaics, wind turbines and battery storage are experiencing exponential cost declines and exponentially increasing adoption rates. Since 2010, solar PV costs have fallen over 80 per cent, onshore wind over 45 per cent and lithium-ion batteries almost 90 per cent. Empirically grounded technology forecasting demonstrates that these cost curves are consistent and predictable, and that by 2030, battery-firmed solar and wind will be the cheapest available electricity generation virtually everywhere on Earth (Way et al., 2022). **Critically, once built, these assets produce energy at near-zero marginal cost with no continuous fuel imports - the fundamental distinction from the fossil fuel system that the current crisis exposes.**



Energy costs become a function of domestic investment, not global commodity markets

5.1 Electrify

Every unit of demand shifted from fossil fuels to electricity reduces exposure to the volatility now devastating household budgets and industrial competitiveness. Priority areas include:

- mass deployment of heat pumps to displace gas boilers; accelerated electric vehicle adoption and charging infrastructure;
- industrial electrification where technically feasible;
- and deep retrofit of the building stock to reduce total energy demand.

Each heat pump installed, each EV charged from domestic renewables, is a permanent reduction in the UK's and Europe's structural fossil fuel vulnerability.

Policymakers must confront two structural obstacles that are slowing this electrification.

First, the economics of heat pump adoption are being artificially distorted. Gas remains cheap relative to electricity not because of underlying production costs but because policy levies - including network charges, capacity market costs and Contracts for Difference obligations - are disproportionately loaded onto electricity bills rather than distributed across all fuels. This creates a perverse signal in which heat pumps, despite being three to four times more thermally efficient than gas boilers, appear more expensive to operate for the households they are intended to attract. Correcting this levy imbalance is a precondition for heat electrification at scale and requires no new technology and regulatory rebalancing.

Second, the 60-plus billion cubic metres per year of LNG regasification capacity built across Europe since 2022 represents sunk capital with 20-30 year utilisation requirements. This infrastructure will generate sustained commercial and political pressure against the demand reduction through heat electrification, industrial switching and renewable deployment that makes it redundant. Policymakers should anticipate this lobbying dynamic and insulate transition policy from it (OIES, 2025).

5.2 Renewabilise

Wind, solar and storage should be treated as national security infrastructure and deployed at the speed and scale that security designation implies. The UK's [National Energy System Operator \(NESO\)](#) has outlined a pathway to a clean power system by 2030 (NESO, 2024). The [European Commission's REPowerEU plan](#) set ambitious renewable targets explicitly framed around energy security following the 2022 Russian gas disruption (European Commission, 2022). **The Iran crisis makes the case for accelerating these timelines.**

The economics of this acceleration are decisive on purely commercial grounds. The UK's Contract for Difference (CfD) mechanism which is the auction-based guaranteed offtake instrument that de-risks renewable investment has delivered offshore wind at strike prices of £37-50 per MWh in recent allocation rounds (DESNZ, 2025). Gas-fired generation at current market prices costs £80-120 per MWh or more. The CfD mechanism is proven, fully understood by institutional capital markets and scalable without new institutions or new technology and it requires only political commitment to expand its scope and funding envelope.

The affordability comparison is equally stark. The UK government spent in excess of £100 billion on energy bill subsidies and emergency support measures during the 2022-2024 crisis period

(HM Treasury, 2024). The capital required to build an oversized renewable system capable of meeting peak demand from domestic clean generation and thereby eliminating the gas-price transmission mechanism that caused those bills is estimated at approximately £80-120 billion over five years (NESO, 2024). The renewable investment costs less than one crisis and delivers a permanent productive asset rather than temporary fiscal relief.

5.3 Digitalise

The electricity system should be treated as a strategic digital infrastructure, rather than a passive wires business. This means:

- smart grids with real-time visibility across the system;
- better power electronics to manage distributed generation and storage;
- demand response mechanisms that allow flexible loads to support system balance;
- and locational signals that direct generation, storage and demand to where they are most needed.

Digitalisation is cheap relative to physical infrastructure, fast to deploy and immediately effective at reducing system costs and improving resilience. The current grid operates at approximately 20 per cent average capacity utilisation. **Better power electronics, digital management and flexibility could dramatically improve that figure without proportional capital expenditure.**

5.4 Decentralise

A distributed energy system is inherently more resilient than a centralised one. More distributed generation and storage means lower exposure to single points of failure. Local systems that can continue operating under stress provide the kind of resilience that centralised systems, dependent on long transmission lines and concentrated generation, cannot.

Homes, cars and industrial sites with storage capacity become active participants in system resilience rather than passive loads. **The power system across Europe is best protected by decentralising - localising resilience so that disruptions can be contained rather than cascading across national grids.**

5.5 The Superabundance Opportunity: From Scarcity to Surplus


Conventional policy thinking about the clean energy transition still operates within a scarcity paradigm: how to match limited renewable output to existing demand patterns using the minimum necessary infrastructure. **Recent modelling challenges this assumption fundamentally and reveals that the optimal strategy is to build far more generation capacity than current demand requires - producing a structural surplus of clean energy that transforms the economics of the entire system.**

Research by [RethinkX](#) models what this looks like in practice for the UK and key European economies (Dorr et al., 2025). Their *Understanding Stellar Energy* report finds that an optimally

designed solar, wind and battery (SWB) system for the United Kingdom would comprise approximately 223 GW of solar and 479 GW of wind capacity, supported by 8,431 GWh of battery storage. This system would generate approximately 899 TWh of firm baseload power per year - and a further 1,368 TWh of surplus "Superpower" above and beyond firm baseload requirements. Total electricity generation would be 8 to 14 times greater than current UK output. Wind plays the dominant role in the UK's mix, reflecting the country's exceptional wind resources. The capital cost amounts to approximately \$747 per capita per year over 20 years - comparable to current energy expenditure and substantially less than the cumulative cost of repeated fossil fuel crises and emergency interventions.

For Germany, the model identifies a system of approximately 573 GW solar and 580 GW wind with 6,681 GWh of batteries, producing 1,032 TWh of firm baseload and 1,736 TWh of surplus - 5 to 9 times current German electricity generation, at \$769 per capita per year over 20 years (Dorr et al., 2025). Solar and wind contribute roughly equally in Germany's optimal mix. For Denmark, the model identifies 25 GW solar and 24 GW wind with 1,028 GWh of battery storage at \$801 per capita per year, generating 4 to 9 times current output (Dorr et al., 2025).

From scarcity to superabundance: SWB system output vs current generation



Source: RethinkX, Understanding Stellar Energy (2025). Prosperity Scenario. System: 223 GW solar, 479 GW wind, 8,431 GWh batteries. Cost: \$747 per capita per year over 20 years.

The concept of strategic overbuilding as the route to lowest-cost firm power is now validated by international scientific consensus. The [IEA Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme \(IEA PVPS\) Task 16 Firm Power Generation report](#) - published in February 2026 with contributions from over 25 expert teams across the US, Europe, China, Australia and Canada - confirms through comprehensive modelling and case studies that "a fully renewable, firm power system is

not only technically achievable but economically competitive across diverse geographies" (Perez & Remund, 2026). The report identifies four pillars of firm renewable power: optimal wind/solar blending, battery energy storage, overbuilding with strategic curtailment ("implicit storage"), and targeted digitalised flexibility measures (van Eldik & van Sark, 2026).

The Swiss Federal Energy Office study within the same report confirms levelised costs of 6.8–8.6 cents per kWh across all scenarios, and finds that without strategic overbuilding and curtailment, costs would escalate by 24–80 per cent (Remund et al., 2024). A Netherlands study finds that overbuilt renewables can technically deliver firm power with storage and flexibility - but that current market structures fail to support viable business cases, making market reform the binding constraint rather than technology (Berkhout et al., 2024).

The surplus energy - the "Superpower" that a correctly sized system produces above baseload requirements - should no longer be seen as waste. **It is the foundation of a new industrial strategy.**

Near-zero marginal cost electricity available at scale enables entirely new industries and applications: green hydrogen production via electrolysis, e-fuel synthesis for aviation and shipping, ammonia production for fertilisers and industrial feedstock (which could become a critical need in the context of prolonged global gas shortages), electric arc furnace steelmaking, direct air carbon capture, desalination, and data centre operations.

Countries and regions that build surplus clean energy capacity first will attract these industries; those that do not will import their products. The strategic choice facing UK and European policymakers is whether to capture this industrial opportunity or cede it to competitors - primarily China, which is already building at precisely this scale.

6. Grid and Market Reform: The Missing Chapter

It is widely presumed that Britain and Europe have a generation problem. In reality, they have a grid-operating-model and market-design problem. This is perhaps the most underappreciated dimension of the crisis, and the area where immediate policy action can deliver the fastest results. The IEA PVPS Firm Power report identifies market reform as the single most critical enabler: current electricity markets, designed around fuel-based generation, "may not fully value the system services needed to integrate VREs, energy storage, and supply/demand flexibility into a reliable, low-cost supply portfolio" (Perez & Remund, 2026).

Grid operators are the greatest bottleneck. Connection queues for new renewable generation and storage projects stretch years into the future. NESO's own [connections reform programme](#) acknowledges the scale of the backlog (NESO, 2025). Curtailment - paying wind farms to switch off because the grid cannot absorb their output - is a sign of poor system design, not evidence that renewables are unreliable. In the UK, curtailment costs alone ran to nearly £1.5 billion in 2025. That is wasted clean energy and wasted money. Transmission system operators should be given clear deadlines - three years to fundamentally reform connection processes and curtailment management - with regulatory penalties for avoidable delay. Under current UK rules, TSOs pay curtailment costs in year one but only a third of those costs in year two, creating perverse incentives that delay reform.

The gas-price transmission mechanism must be broken. Europe's marginal pricing system means the most expensive generator - almost always a gas plant - sets the price for the entire market. The primary beneficiary of this system is the gas producer, not the consumer and not the renewable generator. Re-regulation of power markets to decouple clean electricity prices from gas prices is the single most effective measure to reduce household and industrial energy costs and shield them from future fossil fuel shocks. The [European Commission's work on electricity market reform](#) and affordability measures points in the right direction (European Commission, 2026), but the pace must accelerate dramatically. The IEA PVPS report recommends a transition toward "capacity-centred remuneration, where resources are aggregated and compensated for their availability and firm contribution rather than only their marginal cost" (Perez & Remund, 2026).

Storage must be enabled, not obstructed. Grid operators should be actively incentivised to bring decentralised battery storage into the system - in homes, vehicles and industrial sites - to provide flexibility, reduce curtailment and lower price volatility. [Ofgem's recent support for long-duration electricity storage](#) is welcome but insufficient in scale and speed (Ofgem, 2025). Battery storage should be built where grid constraints are worst. Regulators should fine grid operators for avoidable bottleneck behaviour rather than rewarding passive asset management. The UK's [Clean Flexibility Roadmap](#) provides a framework; what is needed now is accelerated implementation with binding timescales (DESNZ, 2025).

Non-wire solutions are real infrastructure. Demand response, distributed storage, smart charging and virtual power plants can defer or eliminate the need for expensive grid reinforcement. These solutions should be valued and procured on equal terms with physical

transmission and distribution investment. The instruction to policymakers cannot be simply "build more grid." It is: build smarter grids, faster interconnection, more storage, more flexibility and a fundamentally different operating logic that treats electricity as a risk-managed, digitally optimised system.

7. Supply Chains, China and the Real Risk

The strongest objection to rapid clean electrification is the manufacturing and materials dependency it creates, particularly on China. There are real risks here, but they are fundamentally different from fossil fuel dependence, and conflating the two leads to paralysis rather than policy.

Fossil fuel dependence is continuous and geologically fixed. A gas-dependent economy must import gas every day, from sources determined by geology, through chokepoints determined by geography. Clean-technology dependence is front-loaded and industrially changeable. Once a solar panel is installed, it generates electricity for 40 years plus with no fuel imports. Once a battery is built, it stores and discharges domestic energy with no ongoing supply chain exposure. The import dependency is a one-time manufacturing question, not a permanent fuel question.

What the risk is. China currently dominates solar panel manufacturing, battery cell production and the processing of several critical minerals. The [IEA's Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025](#) documents the concentration of mineral processing, particularly for lithium, graphite and certain rare earth elements (IEA, 2025c). The [IEA's State of Clean Technology Manufacturing report](#) maps the scale of the manufacturing challenge (IEA, 2024).

Why this does not overturn the strategy. The materials picture is more nuanced than often presented. The key battery materials are lithium and graphite, both geologically abundant - the constraint is processing capacity, currently concentrated in China but diversifiable with industrial policy and capital. Copper is critical but has aluminium alternatives for many applications. Rare earth materials, while China dominates processing, are not geologically scarce - the monopoly is industrial, not geological, and therefore breakable. Recycling pathways for solar panels and wind turbines exist, are scaling, and should be seen not as a bonus but as integral to a national security strategy for industrial energy sovereignty. The [European Commission's Net-Zero Industry Act](#) aims to build domestic manufacturing capacity for precisely this reason (European Commission, 2024).

The policy response is therefore to accelerate the industrial strategy alongside the energy transition: domestic and allied manufacturing partnerships; vertical integration of mineral processing in producer countries - the model should be to invest in and work with Chile, Australia and others to build local processing capacity for raw materials near their points of extraction, reducing dependence on materials processing dominated by China; strategic

stockpiles where appropriate; and a clear-eyed distinction between materials that genuinely constrain deployment and inflated rare-earth panic narratives that serve incumbent fossil fuel interests.

Finally three further evidential points which support this analysis. First, the wind turbine supply chain is already strategically sovereign. Siemens Gamesa (Spain and Germany) and Vestas (Denmark) together account for approximately 40 per cent of the global offshore wind turbine market (BloombergNEF, 2025). Europe leads in offshore wind installation expertise, specialised vessels and subsea cable engineering capabilities that China and the United States remain years from replicating at comparable scale. The supply chain anxiety that legitimately applies to solar panels does not apply to the component that dominates the UK's optimal energy mix. Wind is already a European industrial asset, and its supply chain advantage is widening, not narrowing.

Second, existing alliance architectures provide diversification pathways qualitatively different from any fossil fuel supply relationship. The UK's AUKUS security partnership and bilateral trade agreement with Australia create preferential access to lithium, rare earths and green hydrogen supply that no OPEC or LNG relationship can match. The proposed Xlinks Morocco-UK power cable, 3.6 GW subsea interconnector designed to transmit Moroccan solar and wind directly to British consumers demonstrates that North African renewable energy is commercially viable and geopolitically accessible at scale (Xlinks, 2024). The EU-India Strategic Partnership and UK-India trade relationship open access to India's rapidly scaling solar manufacturing capacity, providing a credible diversification pathway from Chinese panel supply within three to five years. These are energy security assets in gestation, accessible through relationships that already exist.

Third, when the supply chain risks of fossil fuels and renewables are compared rigorously rather than rhetorically, the analysis resolves decisively in favour of the transition. Fossil fuel supply chain risks are geologically fixed, continuous renewing with every cargo and every heating season and worsening as EROI declines and geographic concentration intensifies among a shrinking pool of producers in politically unstable regions. Renewable supply chain risks are industrially determined, front-loaded, concentrated in the manufacturing and installation phase and declining as domestic capacity scales and allied partnerships deepen. Saudi oil cannot be manufactured in Europe. Solar panels, batteries and wind turbines can be. That asymmetry is the foundation of long-term energy sovereignty.

The central achievement of the electrified sovereignty strategy is that energy costs become a function of domestic infrastructure investment and technology improvement, instead of commodity prices set in contested global markets. The central industrial opportunity is that surplus clean energy becomes the foundation of competitive advantage and economic prosperity, rather than a problem to be curtailed.

8. Time Horizon

8.1 Next 12 Months (Emergency Phase)

- Protect households and critical industry from energy price shocks through targeted, time-limited support with hard sunset clauses.
- Fast-track deployment of battery storage, grid flexibility and digital grid management.
- Reform connection queues to eliminate multi-year backlogs for shovel-ready renewable and storage projects.
- Accelerate heat-pump installation, building retrofit and EV charging infrastructure deployment through streamlined planning and procurement.
- Where temporary fossil fuel bridge support is unavoidable - maintaining gas-fired generation as backup during the transition - it must be explicitly time-limited and structured to avoid new lock-in.
- Begin formal re-regulation of power markets to decouple electricity prices from gas-price setting within a defined three-year timeline.

8.2 By 2030 (Structural Transition)

- Break as much of the gas-price linkage to electricity bills as technically and regulatorily possible. This is the single most important structural reform.
- Scale wind, solar and battery storage to the levels identified in NESO's [Clean Power 2030](#) pathway and the EU's REPowerEU targets - treating these as floors, not ceilings.
- Build grid interconnection across the UK and Europe to permit large-scale decentralised energy transmission and sharing, as well as long-duration storage and flexible demand at scale.
- Reorient public and institutional capital toward domestic transition assets.
- Align UK-EU market reform, grid standards and supply-chain strategy to create a unified clean energy security architecture.
- Establish domestic and allied-nation manufacturing capacity for solar panels, batteries and critical mineral processing, reducing single-supplier exposure.

8.3 Mid-2030s (System Completion and Superabundance)

- Complete the shift to a resilient, electrified, low-fuel-cost energy system in which the vast majority of power, heat and transport runs on domestically generated clean electricity.
- Build toward the superabundant energy system identified by RethinkX modelling: e.g. 223 GW solar and 479 GW wind for the UK, generating 8–14 times current output, with surplus energy powering new hydrogen, e-fuel, industrial and data-processing industries.
- Large nuclear, where viable, serves as a bounded complement - not the primary strategy.
- Fossil fuel use is reduced to residual industrial applications with clear phase-out trajectories.

References

- Ahmed, N. M. (2017). *Failing states, collapsing systems: BioPhysical triggers of political violence*. Springer. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47816-6>
- Ahmed, N. M. (2024). Planetary phase shift as a new systems framework to navigate the evolutionary transformation of human civilisation. *Foresight*, 26(4). <https://doi.org/10.1108/FS-09-2023-0184>
- Al Jazeera. (2026, March 20). *Iran hits Kuwaiti oil refinery as Israel renews attacks on Tehran*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/20/kuwait-oil-refinery-hit-again-as-iran-targets-gulf-energy-infrastructure>
- Argus Media. (2026, March 25). As cited in: CNBC. (2026, March 25). *Fertilizer prices surge amid Iran war, sparking food security warnings*. <https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/25/fertilizer-price-iran-war-food-security-inflation-urea-potash-nitrogen-farmers.html>
- Bank of England. (2026, March 19). *Monetary Policy Summary*. <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2026/march-2026>
- Berkhout, C., et al. (2024). *Electricity mix and market dynamics in 2035 CO2-free electricity system*. Rijksoverheid. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2024/08/31/elektriciteitsmix-en-marktdynamiek-in-2035-co2-vrij-elektriciteitssysteem>
- Bloomberg. (2026, March 25). *Here's a list of Gulf energy infrastructure damaged in Iran war*. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-25/here-s-a-list-of-gulf-energy-infrastructure-damaged-in-iran-war>
- Brockway, P. E., Heun, M. K., Santos, J., & Barrett, J. R. (2024). Estimation of useful-stage energy returns on investment for fossil fuels and implications for renewable energy systems. *Nature Energy*. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-024-01518-6>
- Brockway, P. E., Owen, A., Brand-Correa, L. I., & Hardt, L. (2019). Estimation of global final-stage energy-return-on-investment for fossil fuels with comparison to renewable energy sources. *Nature Energy*, 4(7), 612–621. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-019-0425-z>
- Chatham House. (2026). *US energy prices were set to rise long before the Iran war*. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/03/us-energy-prices-were-set-rise-long-iran-war>
- Chemistry World. (2025, December 18). *Chemicals industry roundup 2025*. <https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/chemicals-industry-roundup-2025/4022541.article>

CNBC. (2026, March 25). *Fertilizer prices surge amid Iran war, sparking food security warnings*. <https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/25/fertilizer-price-iran-war-food-security-inflation-urea-potash-nitrogen-farmers.html>

Cornwall Insight. (2026, March). As cited in: AJ Bell. (2026, March). *Energy spike from Iran war could add 1% to UK inflation in 2026 — OBR*. <https://www.ajbell.co.uk/news/articles/energy-spike-iran-war-could-add-1-uk-inflation-2026-obr>

Court, V., & Fizaine, F. (2017). Long-term estimates of the energy-return-on-investment (EROI) of coal, oil, and gas global productions. *Ecological Economics*, 138, 145–159. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.03.015>

CRU Group (Lawson, C.). (2026, March). As cited in: PBS NewsHour. (2026, March 30). *The planting season is now, but war in Iran has sparked a global fertilizer shortage*. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/the-planting-season-is-now-but-war-in-iran-has-sparked-a-global-fertilizer-shortage>

Defra. (2026, March). Farm income statistics. As cited in: The Conversation. (2026, March). *How the war in Iran is already affecting UK farmers and food production*. <https://theconversation.com/how-the-war-in-iran-is-already-affecting-uk-farmers-and-food-production-279032>

Delannoy, L., Longaretti, P.-Y., Murphy, D. J., & Prados, E. (2021). Peak oil and the low-carbon energy transition: A net-energy perspective. *Applied Energy*, 304, 117843. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.117843>

DESNZ. (2025). *Clean flexibility roadmap*. UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68874ddeb0e1dfe5b5f0e431/clean-flexibility-roadmap.pdf>

DESNZ. (2025). *Energy trends: December 2025*. UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6941a0321d8a56d23b7f0b4d/Energy_Trends_December_2025.pdf

DESNZ. (2025). *Gas system in transition: Security of supply consultation*. UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69440cf49273c48f554cf5ed/gas-security-of-supply-consultation-document.pdf>

Deutsche Bank (Raja, S.). (2026, March). As cited in: CNBC. (2026, March 25). *UK inflation unchanged in February in last print before the Iran war*. <https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/25/uk-inflation-february-2026-iran-war-energy-prices-cpi.html>

DNV. (2026, March). *Iran war energy transition research note* [Research note]. Reported in: reNews. (2026, March 26). *Iran war boosts renewables outlook*. <https://renews.biz/110746/iran-war-boosts-renewables-outlook/>

Dombrovskis, V. (2026, March). EU Commission stagflation risk statement. As cited in: Investing.com. (2026, March 26). *Iran war could mean stagflation for EU, Dombrovskis says*. <https://www.investing.com/news/economic-indicators/iran-war-could-mean-stagflation-for-eu-dombrovskis-says-4585001>

Dorr, A., Arbib, J., & Seba, T. (2025). *Understanding stellar energy: How SWB Superpower will create clean energy superabundance*. RethinkX. <https://www.rethinkx.com/publications/understandingstellarenergy2025.en>

ECB. (2024). *Financial Stability Review*. European Central Bank. <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/fsr/html/index.en.html>

ECB. (2026a). *ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, March 2026*. European Central Bank. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/projections/html/ecb.projections202603_ecbstaff~ebe291cd3d.en.html

EIA. (2025). US crude oil production forecast. *Short-Term Energy Outlook, June 2025*. US Energy Information Administration. <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=66844>

Enerdata. (2025). *Crude oil production statistics*. <https://yearbook.enerdata.net/crude-oil/world-production-statistics.html>

European Commission. (2022). *REPowerEU plan*. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/actions-and-measures-energy-prices/repowereu-3-years_en

European Commission. (2024). *Net-Zero Industry Act*. https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability/net-zero-industry-act_en

European Commission. (2026). *5 things you should know about your electricity bill*. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/5-things-you-should-know-about-your-electricity-bill-2026-02-17_en

Food Manufacture. (2026, March 26). *Iran war: Expert discuss its impact on the UK food sector and wider economy*. <https://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Article/2026/03/26/iran-war-expert-discuss-its-impact-on-the-uk-food-sector-and-wider-economy/>

Hall, C. A. S. (2017). *Energy return on investment: A unifying principle for biology, economics, and sustainability*. Springer.

Homer-Dixon, T. (2000). *The ingenuity gap*. Knopf.

Homer-Dixon, T. (2002, December 4). *Synchronous failure: The real danger of the 21st century* [Speech transcript]. Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. <https://homerdixon.com/synchronous-failure-the-real-danger-of-the-21st-century/>

Homer-Dixon, T. (2006). *The upside of down: Catastrophe, creativity, and the renewal of civilization*. Knopf.

Homer-Dixon, T. (2011). Complexity science. *Oxford Leadership Journal*, 2(1). <https://homerdixon.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Homer-Dixon-Oxford-Leadership-Journal-Manion-lecture.pdf>

Homer-Dixon, T., Walker, B., Biggs, R., Crépin, A.-S., Folke, C., Lambin, E. F., Peterson, G. D., Rockström, J., Scheffer, M., Steffen, W., & Troell, M. (2015). Synchronous failure: The emerging causal architecture of global crisis. *Ecology and Society*, 20(3), 6. <https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-07681-200306>

House of Commons Library. (2026, March). *Economic update: Middle East conflict and the UK economy*. <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10601/>

IEA. (2024). *The state of clean technology manufacturing*. International Energy Agency. <https://www.iea.org/reports/the-state-of-clean-technology-manufacturing/analysis>

IEA. (2025a). *Oil 2025: Analysis and forecast to 2030*. International Energy Agency. <https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-2025/executive-summary>

IEA. (2025b). *The implications of oil and gas field decline rates*. International Energy Agency. <https://www.iea.org/reports/the-implications-of-oil-and-gas-field-decline-rates/executive-summary>

IEA. (2025c). *Global critical minerals outlook 2025*. International Energy Agency. <https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2025/executive-summary>

IEA. (2026). *Oil market report — March 2026*. International Energy Agency. <https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-march-2026>

IEA. (2026c). *Oil market report — March 2026* [Full report]. International Energy Agency. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/a25ddf53-cd6c-4910-ac90-16bfd28399e7/-12MAR2026_OilMarketReport.pdf

IFPRI. (2026, March). *The Iran war: Potential food security impacts*. International Food Policy Research Institute. <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/the-iran-war-potential-food-security-impacts/>

Martinsen, A. (2026, March). *Gulf energy infrastructure: Cost of war and recovery analysis* [Research note]. Rystad Energy.

<https://www.rystadenergy.com/news/middle-east-conflict-rebuild-energy-cost>

Medicines UK (Samuels, M.). (2026, March). As cited in: Pharmacy Business. (2026, March). *UK 'weeks away' from medicine shortages, experts warn.*

<https://www.pharmacy.biz/uk-medicine-shortage-iran-war/>

Moody's (Weeks, D.). (2026, March). As cited in: LBC. (2026, March). *NHS chief says he's 'really worried' about supply chain shocks due to Iran war.*

https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/nhs-england-iran-war-supplies-warning-5HjdX7J_2/

Murphy, D. J., Raugei, M., Carbajales-Dale, M., & Rubio Estrada, B. (2022). Energy return on investment of different fuels and the implications for society. *Sustainability*, 14(14), 7098.

<https://doi.org/10.3390/su14147098>

NESO. (2024). *Clean power 2030*. National Energy System Operator.

<https://www.neso.energy/publications/clean-power-2030>

NESO. (2025). *Great Britain's connections reform*. National Energy System Operator.

<https://www.neso.energy/document/346816/download>

NHS England (Mackey, J.). (2026, March). As cited in: LBC. (2026, March). *NHS chief says he's 'really worried' about supply chain shocks due to Iran war.*

https://www.lbc.co.uk/article/nhs-england-iran-war-supplies-warning-5HjdX7J_2/

OBR. (2026). *Treasury Committee evidence session, March 2026*. Office for Budget Responsibility.

OECD. (2026, March 26). *OECD interim economic outlook*. As cited in: CNBC. (2026, March 26). *UK could be worse hit from Iran war of all major economies, OECD.*

<https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/26/uk-could-be-worse-hit-from-iran-war-of-all-major-economies-oecd.html>

Ofgem. (2025). *Ofgem super-charging clean power storage for the first time in 40 years* [Press release].

<https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/press-release/ofgem-super-charging-clean-power-storage-first-time-40-years>

Oxford Economics (Goodwin, A.). (2026, March). As cited in: deVere Group. (2026, March). *Is the UK in a recession? How the Iran war could spark a downturn.*

<https://www.devere-group.com/is-the-uk-in-a-recession-how-the-iran-war-could-spark-a-downturn/>

Oxford Economics. (2025). European chemical industry output and competitiveness assessment. As cited in: gasworld. (2025, October 9). *Europe's chemical decline threatens*

industrial gas demand.

<https://www.gasworld.com/story/europes-chemical-decline-threatens-industrial-gas-demand/2166547.article/>

Perez, R., & Remund, J. (Eds.). (2026). *Firm power generation* (Report No. T16-07:2026). IEA PVPS Task 16. <https://iea-pvps.org/key-topics/t16-firm-power-generation-2026/>

Qaim, M. (2026, March). University of Bonn. As cited in: ZME Science. (2026, March 30). *Why the war in Iran could trigger the worst global food crisis since the 1970s.*
<https://www.zmescience.com/science/news-science/iran-war-food-crisis/>

QatarEnergy. (2026, March 19). *Production update on Ras Laffan Industrial City damage* [Press release].
<https://www.lngindustry.com/liquefaction/20032026/qatarenergy-provides-production-update/>

Remund, J., Perez, M., & Perez, R. (2024). Firm PV power generation for Switzerland: Updates 2023. Swiss Federal Energy Office.
<https://www.aramis.admin.ch/Default?DocumentID=71549&Load=true>

Resolution Foundation. (2026, March). As cited in: ITV News. (2026, March 3). *UK economy could face 'significant hit' from war in Middle East, OBR warns.*
<https://www.itv.com/news/2026-03-03/uk-economy-could-face-significant-hit-from-war-in-middle-east-obr-warns>

Simon-Kucher. (2025). As cited in: C&EN. (2026, January). *In Europe, more lights will go out at chemical plants.*
<https://cen.acs.org/business/economy/Europe-lights-chemical-plants/104/web/2026/01>

Stelter, D. (2026, March). As cited in: Euronews. (2026, March 5). *Then the euro will slide: Experts warn of prolonged war with Iran.*
<https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/03/05/then-the-euro-will-slide-experts-warn-of-prolonged-war-with-iran>

T. Rowe Price (Wieladek, T.). (2026, March). As cited in: deVere Group. (2026, March). *Is the UK in a recession? How the Iran war could spark a downturn.*
<https://www.devere-group.com/is-the-uk-in-a-recession-how-the-iran-war-could-spark-a-downturn/>

The Economy. (2026, March 29). *Eurozone borrowing costs surge to multi-decade highs as Iran shock threatens a fiscal vicious circle.*
<https://economy.com.pk/eurozone-borrowing-costs-surge-to-multi-decade-highs-as-iran-shock-threatens-a-fiscal-vicious-circle/>

van Eldik, R., & van Sark, W. (2026). Firm wind and solar photovoltaic power with proactive curtailment: A European analysis. *Energy Conversion & Management.*
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enconman.2025.120399>

Way, R., Ives, M. C., Mealy, P., & Farmer, J. D. (2022). Empirically grounded technology forecasts and the energy transition. *Joule*, 6(9), 2057–2082.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2022.08.009>

Wood Mackenzie. (2025). European ethylene capacity closure risk assessment. As cited in: Chemistry World. (2025, December 18). *Chemicals industry roundup 2025*.

<https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/chemicals-industry-roundup-2025/4022541.article>