

REBUILD TRUST

**Rigged economies, fractured societies
and the case for change**

September 2026

Authors

Owen Gaffney, Kate Pickett.

Contributing authors

Philippa Baumgartner, Léna Belly-Le Guilloux,
Till Kellerhoff, Clara Barbara, Stephan
Klinkenberg, Nathalie Spittler.

Ipsos

Ioanna Fotiadis, Andrew Cleary,
Mia Fennimore Holdsworth.

Reviewers

Simon Ticehurst, Movements and Advocacy
Lead, Wellbeing Economy Alliance.

Thomas Lux, Senior Researcher, Max Planck
Institute for Political and Social Science.

Sandrine Dixson-Declève, Earth4All
Executive Chair and Honorary President
of the Club of Rome.

Recommended citation

Gaffney, O., Pickett, K., Baumgartner, P., Belly-
Le Guilloux, L., Kellerhoff, T., Barbara, C.,
Klinkenberg, S. and Spittler, N. (2026) *Rebuild
Trust: Rigged economies, fractured societies
and the case for change*. Earth4All.

Views or opinions expressed herein do not
necessarily represent those of Earth4All
partner organisations or other organisations
supporting the work.

This work is licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0
International [Licence](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). For any commercial use
please contact info@clubofrome.org



Executive summary

In the year that one person's wealth passed 1 trillion dollars, 4 out of 10 people across the largest economies on Earth worry that they will not have enough money to cover their basic needs over the next 12 months.

In 2026, Earth4All conducted our third G20 survey with Ipsos. Following our previous surveys on the global commons and planetary stewardship, this time we wanted to understand social cohesion and social tension – important factors in building momentum for transformation.

People across the G20 want their economies transformed, but they no longer trust their governments to achieve this change. Seven in ten say there is too much inequality (70%), that the system is rigged to benefit the rich and powerful (65%) and that the economy needs major change (69%).

Yet only 31% believe their government will make decisions that benefit people 20 or 30 years from now. Across these societies, people – rich and poor, left and right, top of the ladder and bottom – have stopped believing the state will act in their long-term interest. This is the central finding of the Earth for All Survey 2026. Two in three feel their country is more divided than a decade ago (67%), and 40% would now prefer a strong leader unconstrained by parliament and elections. The mandate for change is overwhelming but the trust to deliver it has collapsed. And that collapse runs through the whole social fabric.

A near-universal diagnosis: the system is perceived as rigged everywhere.

- ▶ 70% say there is too much economic inequality in their country, and 65% that the economic system is “rigged to benefit the rich and powerful”; 69% want major changes to the economic system, against only 8% who disagree.
- ▶ The climate mandate is real but conditional. 54% accept strong government action on emissions even at the cost of higher prices, but support falls sharply among lower-income, lower-status and right-leaning respondents, and is markedly higher in lower- and upper-middle-income countries than in high-income ones.

A society that feels itself coming apart.

- ▶ Two in three people (67%) say their country is more divided than it was 10 years ago.
- ▶ 71% perceive serious tension between supporters of different political parties, 63% between people on high and low incomes, 62% between immigrants and the native-born, and 53% between the climate-concerned and the sceptical.

The trust deficit at the heart of societies.

- ▶ Long-term trust is the weakest link: fewer than a third of people (31%) trust their government to make decisions that will benefit the majority of people 20 or 30 years from now.
- ▶ Support for democracy holds, but it is contested. 68% say democracy is the best way to govern their country, yet 40% say their country would be better off with a strong leader unconstrained by parliament and elections – rising above half in several upper-middle-income countries.

A mandate for systemic economic change

The survey results, backed by our previous surveys and recent related surveys by independent groups, show that the majority of people want economic systems change. It seems there is a profound mismatch between public support for economic change and what mainstream political parties are willing to offer. This opens the door for new social contracts between governments and publics that promise economic systems change for the benefit of the majority, at a time of deep turbulence.

Countries surveyed

The survey, conducted by Ipsos, focused on G20 countries plus Sweden. China and Saudi Arabia were not included in the survey due to sensitivities relating to questions that are of a political nature. Russia was not included due to the Ukrainian war. Together, the 17 countries surveyed account for 58% of global GDP, 38% of the world's population and 37% of global CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels and industry.


Rebuild Trust

Rigged economies, fractured societies and the case for change






1 A near-universal diagnosis: **the system is perceived as rigged everywhere.**



2 Societies feel themselves coming apart.



3 There is a trust deficit at the heart of societies.



Contents

Executive summary	3
1. Introduction	6
2. A near-universal diagnosis	9
3. A society that feels itself coming apart	14
4. Trust in political institutions has collapsed	18
5. A blocked society	22
6. Country summaries	23
6.1 Argentina	23
6.2 Australia	25
6.3 Brazil	27
6.4 Canada	29
6.5 France	31
6.6 Germany	33
6.7 Great Britain	35
6.8 India	37
6.9 Indonesia	39
6.10 Italy	41
6.11 Japan	43
6.12 Mexico	45
6.13 South Africa	47
6.14 South Korea	49
6.15 Sweden	51
6.16 Türkiye	53
6.17 United States of America	55
7. References	57
8. Methodology and background	60

1. Introduction

1.1 Planetary stewardship

The Earth for All Survey 2026 is the third wave in a programme commissioned by Earth4All and conducted by Ipsos, following the **Global Commons Survey** (2021) and the **Earth for All Survey** (2024).^{1,2} Ipsos surveyed 13,516 adults across 17 countries — the G20 minus China, Russia and Saudi Arabia, plus Sweden — between 20 February and 6 March 2026, with national data weighted by age, gender, region and working status.

The first two waves examined attitudes to our planet, our home. According to the data, most people in most of the world's wealthiest countries support planetary stewardship. They are concerned about the state of Earth, they want to protect it for the long term, and they support immediate and ambitious government action to stabilise our climate and nature. The 2024 analysis identified three engaged groups, 61% of respondents, who want action with varying degrees of urgency. Just 13% of people were categorised as climate sceptics, and the remaining 26% were not strongly engaged either way.




Figure 1. Who wants action to protect the planet?

However, despite overwhelming public support across the G20, the world is approaching dangerous climate tipping points — the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets and the Amazon rainforest among them.³ Crossing tipping points condemns future generations to constant turbulence for thousands of years. If the publics of the wealthiest countries already want stewardship and support systemic action, the obstacle to that action lies somewhere other than in public will. Something stands between the planetary stewardship mandate and its delivery, and exploring this is the purpose of this report.

Our model (Earth4All 2023) showed that future climate developments are a function of inequality, which is a strong driver of social tension.⁴⁻⁶ Our 2026 survey points to the obstacle lying not in public will but in a collapse of trust between citizens and the state: the fracturing of the social contract. This report, then, is a pilot analysis exploring social capital, social cohesion and social tension. This will form the basis of regular reports tracking social cohesion and tension.

1.2 The social contract

The idea of a social contract is the foundation of legitimate governance: citizens accept the authority of the state in return for protection, order, fair treatment and the preservation of basic rights and freedoms.⁷ Under a social contract, governments should act in the interests of the majority of people and act ethically, competently and efficiently. An obvious practical outcome is that citizens feel taxes are justified and fair. The social contract is the basis of social cohesion in society.⁸

Long-term policy, which will have impact over decades and generations, is the most demanding thing a contract is ever asked to bear. While some of the transitions required to stabilise the climate and reform the economy will have short-to-medium-term benefits, others ask citizens to accept costs now — in taxation, in prices, in altered ways of living — against benefits that fall decades away and, in large part, on people not yet born. A government cannot compel such consent; it must earn it. And earning it depends on a particular kind of trust: confidence that the state can make decisions today that will benefit the majority 20 or 30 years from now. This is not the same as approval of a government's current economic management, and it behaves differently, because it requires agreement that holds across parties and across election cycles. Where this long-term trust is absent, the case for accepting short-term costs in exchange for long-term gains has a weak foundation, however popular the goal itself may be.

In many countries the social contract is breaking down.⁹ The past decades have brought rising inequality, a prolonged cost-of-living shock, deepening partisan division and contested politics around migration, as articulated most recently in the World Inequality Report (2026).¹⁰ Democratic institutions are in retreat across much of the world, and several G20 governments, the United States among them, have stepped back from earlier net-zero commitments, while parties advocating strong climate action meet electoral resistance.¹¹ The common thread is a widening gap between what citizens are asked to accept and what they believe they are getting in return.

Can a social contract approaching breaking point be fixed? The foundations of a new one are already here: a shared long-term project in the form of broad public support for planetary stewardship, a fairer settlement in the form of economic systems change, and a redistribution of wealth that signals elite capture of government is unacceptable.

Our 2026 survey measures the public perceptions of the social contract directly: how citizens feel about the fairness of their economy, how far they trust the state to act for the long term, how divided they believe their society has become, and on what terms they will support large-scale change. We did this to try to find some answers as to the paradox that most people want action to protect the planet but support is on the rise for political parties that dismiss the urgency to act.

1.3 Social cohesion and social tension

To measure the condition of the social contract, the survey explores two distinct but related concepts: social cohesion and social tension.

Social cohesion has many definitions, but recent cross-national work conceptualises social cohesion as follows: “Social cohesion, understood as a binding force that holds society together, refers to the horizontal relations among members of society (individuals and groups), as well as the vertical relationship between these actors and public institutions. Social cohesion is characterised by a set of attitudes and behavioural manifestations that includes trust, an inclusive identity, and cooperation for the common good.”¹² Social cohesion is often described more plainly as the bonds, or “glue”, that hold a society together; more cohesive societies tend to be healthier, more resilient to shocks, and more able to carry through change that benefits everyone.¹²⁻¹⁴ This report adopts a complementary working definition: cohesion is the extent of trust in government and within society, and the willingness to act collectively towards a shared long-term vision (United Nations Development Programme, 2020).¹⁵ Cohesion cannot be observed directly or reduced to a single indicator; it must be inferred from its components, and it matters most where institutions are weak and cohesion partly compensates for what the state fails to deliver.^{12,16}

Social tension can be conceptualised as the counterpart of social cohesion: a latent state between distinct social groups, with the potential to escalate into open conflict.¹⁷ However, it can also be more broadly defined as a “mismatch between needs, interests and values on the one hand, and level of them to be met, on the other.”¹⁸ This means social tension also depends on developments over time, and it arises from both objective conditions and people’s perceptions of them, so any adequate measure must combine the two.^{18–22} Despite social tension often being seen as a threat, it is a driver for change — positive and negative.^{20,22} Whether social tension leads to progress or conflict depends on the institutions in place and how well they are designed to deal with it (e.g. in democracies).

The recent UN High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP (2026) treats social cohesion as both a driver and an outcome of human progress and describes a rupture between what governments pursue as policy and what citizens recognise as meaningful progress, expressed in declining trust in public institutions.²³ The same fall in institutional trust is documented across the G20 by the Edelman Trust Barometer.²⁴

A substantial body of research argues that economic inequality weighs heavily on social cohesion. Higher inequality predicts lower trust, greater status anxiety and weaker social bonds; it acts as a social stressor that frays the relational fabric of a society.^{25–27} It erodes generalised trust, and low-trust societies can become trapped, with distrust blocking the very policies that would rebuild it.^{28,29} Concentrated wealth converts into concentrated political influence, producing the widespread sense that the system is rigged.^{30–32} Wealth and income inequality are not only important in material terms. Struggles over respect and dignity are as foundational as struggles over income, and the experience of being looked down upon predicts political alienation more powerfully than income loss alone.^{33–36}

In relation to the social contract, the 2026 survey has three key findings, and these organise the rest of this report.


1. A near-universal diagnosis. Across the 17 countries, 70% agree there is too much economic inequality, 65% agree the system is rigged in favour of the wealthy, and 69% agree major economic change is needed, with only 8% opposing the call for change. This is consensus, not conflict.
2. A society that feels itself coming apart. Two in three believe their country is more divided than it was a decade ago, and majorities perceive serious tension between political camps, between income groups, between immigrants and the native-born, and between the climate-concerned and the sceptical.
3. A hollowing out of trust in core political institutions. Only 31% trust government to act for the long term, and 40% would prefer a strong leader unencumbered by parliament and elections, even as 68% continue to hold democracy to be the best system of government.

These findings are further explored in the rest of the report, and beneath each lies a deficit — of distribution, of recognition, of trust — that the contract has failed to honour.

2. A near-universal diagnosis

2.1. Inequality, fairness and the demand for change

Too much inequality. Across the 17 countries, 70% of respondents agree there is too much economic inequality in their country, 41% of them strongly, and only 10% disagree. Agreement is highest in countries with a long record of inequality — Brazil (79%), South Africa (78%) and Argentina (76%) — but also in France (77%) and Germany (74%), and it is lowest in Canada (61%), Japan (63%) and, perhaps surprisingly, the United States (62%).



A rigged system, and a demand for change. Two in three respondents (65%) agree that the economic system is rigged to benefit the rich and powerful, with 12% disagreeing; even the lowest readings, in Japan (55%), Canada (56%) and Sweden (57%), exceed half. And 69% agree that major changes to the economic system are needed to improve life for most people, against just 8% who disagree. This deep public consensus on inequality and a rigged system is firmly entrenched, and consistent over time; the inequality figure was similar in 2024 (67%), as was the appetite for major change (67%). Other surveys capture the same dynamic. A 2025 Pew study of 36 countries, including the G20, found that 84% of adults consider the gap between rich and poor a serious problem in their country, with a majority in every country surveyed describing it as at least a moderately big problem.³⁷

To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with the following statements about [COUNTRY]? – The economic system in [Country] is rigged to benefit the rich and powerful





Figure 3. A rigged system

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

The cost of living. The structural diagnosis has become personal. Four out of ten respondents (41%) worry that their household will not have enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, while only a third (33%) do not. The fear is most acute in the upper-middle-income economies – Argentina (68%), Brazil (66%), Mexico (53%), Türkiye (52%) and South Africa (46%) – but it reaches well into the wealthy welfare states: 37% in Germany, 35% in the United States and 31% in Sweden, with only Italy (24%) and France (27%) clearly below a third. Unsurprisingly, within countries the fear is most pronounced among those who have least. Half of lower-income respondents (49%) worry about meeting basic needs, against 37% of higher-income ones, and the gap by subjective social status is starker still – 63% among those who place themselves low on the social ladder, against 34% among those who place themselves high.



A shared diagnosis. The diagnosis is broadly shared. Majorities in every income group agree that there is too much inequality — from 67% of lower-income respondents to 71% of higher-income ones — and that the system is rigged, from 63% of lower-income respondents to 66% of higher-income ones. The clearer differences are in relation to subjective status and to politics; those who place themselves low on the social ladder are the most likely to see too much inequality (78%, against 63% at the top) and to call the system rigged (74%, against 60%), and left-leaning respondents more so than right-leaning ones. But agreement is a majority position across the income distribution, not the property of one camp.

A shared diagnosis, however, is not a shared willingness to pay.

Those who consider themselves of lower social status more likely to perceive economic inequality in their country. In contrast, those with higher household income and higher subjective social status show lower levels of agreement

(Strongly / Tend to agree)	Global Avg.	Gender		Age			Household income			Political affiliation		Subjective social status		
		M	F	<35	35-49	50-74	Low	Med	High	Left wing	Right wing	Low	Med	High
There is too much economic inequality in [country] today	70%	67%	73%	66%	73%	73%	67%	72%	71%	75%	66%	78%	69%	63%
The economic system in [Country] is rigged to benefit the rich and powerful	65%	64%	66%	63%	66%	66%	63%	67%	66%	72%	60%	74%	64%	60%
I worry that my household will not have enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months	41%	40%	43%	43%	44%	38%	49%	40%	37%	43%	39%	63%	38%	34%

Figure 5. A shared diagnosis

Vs average of 17 G20 countries surveyed ■ ≥ 5% higher ■ ≥ 5% lower

Economic inequality appears to be a leading issue, closely followed by the belief that the system is rigged to benefit the rich and powerful




Figure 6. Economic inequality is a leading issue

2.2 The limit of the consensus: the distribution deficit

Should government take strong action now to cut emissions even if this leads to higher prices? A majority of 54% agree, while 17% disagree. In our 2024 survey, a large majority (71%) supported rapid action within the decade,² but our question did not indicate a cost burden to the respondent. In this wave we wanted to test that support by attaching a cost to it, and the cost matters.

Support for strong action despite higher prices is highest in the middle-income and emerging economies that are most often exposed to climate extremes: India (71%), Indonesia (68%) and South Africa (64%). It is lowest in the wealthy democracies most able to absorb the cost — Japan (36%), Canada (44%), Germany (46%), France (47%) and Great Britain (50%). The publics with the deepest pockets are the most reluctant to open them.

To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with the following statements about [COUNTRY]? – To protect people from climate change, our government should take strong action now to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, even if this leads to higher prices





Figure 7. Support for climate action even if it leads to higher prices

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding


Within countries, the cost question opens up divisions that were hidden by the consensus on the need for change. Support for strong action despite higher prices is markedly higher among higher-income respondents (62%) than lower-income ones (47%), among those of higher subjective status (65%) than lower (47%), and among those who lean left (65%) than those who lean right (51%). A companion question points the same way: 36% agree that people like them should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change, that this is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, while 34% disagree — one of the few genuinely two-sided splits in the survey, and one that runs along political lines (43% on the right, 36% on the left). The diagnosis is shared; the bill is not. No transformative transition can hold unless the distribution of its cost is seen to be fair, and on this evidence that condition is not yet met.



3. A society that feels itself coming apart

3.1 Division and the lines of tension

Two in three respondents (67%) agree that their country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, with only 10% disagreeing. The sense of division is sharpest in the wealthy, long-established democracies, often those with the strongest social welfare systems; France (82%), Great Britain (80%), Germany (79%), Sweden (78%) and the United States (73%) record the highest readings, while the lowest are in Japan (46%) and several emerging economies.



Drawing on the 2025 Policy Institute/King's College London survey "The UK's Changing 'Culture Wars': Division, Tension and Common Ground", we formulated questions to compare several lines of tension in society: between supporters of different political parties (71% perceive a lot of tension), between people on high and low incomes (63%), between immigrants and the native-born (62%), and between those concerned about climate change and those sceptical of it (53%).³⁸

Partisan tension is the most widely felt of the four, and the most intense. It is highest in France (85%), Argentina (81%) and the United States (79%), and remarkably low in Japan (36%). Tension over immigration runs highest in South Africa (81%) and in the European democracies — Great Britain (77%), Germany (75%) and Sweden (71%) — and lowest in Brazil (38%). Tension between income groups is highest in South Africa (72%), France (70%) and Germany (69%). Climate is consistently the least divisive of the four sources tested, though by no means trivial, and it is felt most acutely in Germany (66%), India (62%) and the United States (60%).

To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with the following statements about [COUNTRY]? – There is a lot of tension between supporters of different political parties in [Country]




Figure 10. Tension between supporters of different political parties

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Higher-income countries more likely to perceive divisions / tensions with some exceptions, notably Asia and Canada

(Strongly / Tend to agree)	Global Average	Australia	Canada	Germany	France	Great Britain	Italy	Japan	Sweden	South Korea	United States	Argentina	Brazil	Indonesia	Mexico	Türkiye	South Africa	India
There is a lot of tension between supporters of different political parties in [Country]	71%	69%	65%	76%	85%	76%	68%	36%	73%	72%	79%	81%	77%	67%	71%	72%	76%	68%
Today, there is a lot of tension between people with high incomes and people with low incomes in [Country]	63%	59%	56%	69%	70%	63%	59%	48%	52%	64%	65%	69%	67%	63%	60%	66%	72%	64%
Today, there is a lot of tension between immigrants and people born in [Country]	62%	70%	63%	75%	70%	77%	66%	48%	71%	42%	69%	46%	38%	48%	58%	65%	81%	64%
Today, there is a lot of tension between people who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical in [Country]	53%	59%	50%	66%	59%	56%	49%	34%	54%	42%	60%	45%	56%	55%	52%	46%	50%	62%

Figure 11. Perceived tensions in different countries

Vs average of 17 G20 countries surveyed ■ ≥ 5% higher ■ ≥ 5% lower

Right-wing respondents are more likely to believe that their country is more divided and that there is tension with immigrants

(Strongly / Tend to agree)	Global Avg.	Political Affiliation	
		Left wing	Right wing
There is a lot of tension between supporters of different political parties in [Country]	71%	76%	75%
Compared to 10 years ago, [Country] is more divided	67%	72%	69%
Today, there is a lot of tension between people with high incomes and people with low incomes in [Country]	63%	68%	62%
Today, there is a lot of tension between immigrants and people born in [Country]	62%	64%	68%
Today, there is a lot of tension between people who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical in [Country]	53%	59%	53%

Figure 12. Tensions between political affiliations

Vs average of 17 G20 countries surveyed ■ ≥ 5% higher ■ ≥ 5% lower

The United States is an instructive case. It records among the highest readings on division (73%) and partisan tension (79%, with the most intense agreement of any country in the survey), and yet among the lowest agreement that there is too much inequality (62%), despite having the highest measured income inequality of the wealthy democracies in the sample.³⁹

3.2 The recognition deficit

Cohesion is not only a matter of what the state delivers; it is also a matter of whether a society sees, hears and values its members. 41% of respondents agree that people like them are treated with respect and dignity in their country, and 26% disagree. Agreement is lowest in Japan (20%), South Korea (29%) and France (32%), and rises to 50% or above in just three countries: India (62%), Sweden (58%) and Australia (50%). The deficit is steepest by status; just 21% of those who place themselves low on the social ladder feel respected, against 62% of those who place themselves high, although it should be noted that online surveys such as this carry a bias towards people with digital access and higher levels of education in emerging markets such as India.^{40,41}

To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with the following statements about [COUNTRY]? – In [Country], people like me are treated with respect and dignity




Figure 13. Respect and dignity

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Those who consider themselves of lower social status more likely to perceive economic inequality in their country. In contrast, those with higher household income and higher subjective social status show lower levels of agreement

(Strongly / Tend to agree)	Global Avg.	Gender		Age			Household income			Political Affiliation		Subjective social status		
		M	F	<35	35-49	50-74	Low	Med	High	Left wing	Right wing	Low	Med	High
In [Country], people like me are treated with respect and dignity	41%	42%	39%	41%	42%	40%	35%	41%	48%	45%	48%	21%	41%	62%

Figure 14. Perception of respect

Vs average of 17 G20 countries surveyed ■ ≥ 5% higher ■ ≥ 5% lower


In previous surveys, the feeling of being looked down upon can predict political alienation and support for anti-system politics on its own, regardless of whether someone has actually lost income. And it is that feeling — more than income loss itself — through which inequality damages cohesion and wellbeing.^{25,26,34,35,36} Supposedly meritocratic culture insists that the system is fair, with those who fall behind left to conclude that the fault is their own, and humiliation is added to disadvantage.⁴²

A society in which one in four people feel they do not receive respect contains significant combustible material. Many people feel unseen, believe the system is rigged and do not experience their society as a collective enterprise that is pulling together. And this at a moment when societies must pull together if we value a stable planet, which, it seems, the majority of us very much do.

4. Trust in political institutions has collapsed

4.1 The trust deficit

The weakest measured attitude in the survey is trust in government to act for the long term. Only 31% of respondents agree their government can be trusted to make decisions that will benefit the majority of people 20 or 30 years from now, while 41% disagree. No other statement in the survey commands so little agreement.



Trust is lowest where democratic institutions are oldest and strongest on paper. Just 13% of respondents in France trust their government to act for the long term, rising to 19% in Germany, Great Britain and Japan, and 22% in Italy. It is highest in India (59%), an electoral autocracy by V-Dem’s classification, and in Indonesia (40%), Türkiye (39%) and Argentina (39%). Within countries, trust tracks position; 49% of those who place themselves high on the social ladder trust government to act for the long term, against 18% of those who place themselves low. Those with the most to gain from the present arrangement are the most willing to trust it for the long term.

The pattern resists a single explanation, and this report does not impose one. In the fast-growing middle-income countries, comparatively high trust may rest on visible recent improvement in living conditions — a performance legitimacy that grants the state latitude.⁴³ In the wealthy democracies, low trust may be linked to decades of promises not kept, stagnating progress and a sense among many of being left behind. We should also note that in liberal democracies the media openly and continuously criticise government, which can give citizens an impression of incompetence and corruption even where, by comparison with more autocratic regimes, many liberal democracies are high-functioning and trustworthy.

Those who consider themselves of lower social status more likely to perceive economic inequality in their country. In contrast, those with higher household income and higher subjective social status show lower levels of agreement

(Strongly / Tend to agree)	Global Avg.	Gender		Age			Household income			Political Affiliation		Subjective social status		
		M	F	<35	35-49	50-74	Low	Med	High	Left wing	Right wing	Low	Med	High
[Country]'s government can be trusted to make long-term decisions that will benefit the majority of the people 20 to 30 years from now	31%	32%	29%	33%	31%	27%	26%	31%	37%	34%	38%	18%	30%	49%

Figure 16. Long-term trust in government

Vs average of 17 G20 countries surveyed ■ ≥ 5% higher ■ ≥ 5% lower

Low long-term trust in government is an important constraint on the just transition. A public can want economic change and climate action with near unanimity and still decline to grant the state the room those goals require, because trust is missing. This is the weakest link in the chain that runs from public will to public action, and no amount of agreement on the goal can compensate for its failure.

4.2 Democracy must be defended daily in the court of public opinion

Support for democracy is strong but cannot be taken for granted. Across the 17 countries, 68% agree that a democratic system, in which leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern, against only 8% who disagree; support is highest in Great Britain (76%), Sweden (74%) and Australia (73%), and lowest, by a wide margin, in Japan (50%). Yet 40% also agree their country would be better off with a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, while 30% disagree with this position. Support for strong-leader rule is highest in Indonesia (77%), India (61%), South Africa (53%) and Brazil (51%), and lowest in Sweden (21%), Canada (25%) and the United States (26%).

To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with the following statements about [COUNTRY]? – A democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern [Country]





Figure 17. Support for democracy

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

The same publics that endorse democracy in principle seemingly do not reject more concentrated power. Read against the longer data series, the warning is in the trend; agreement that democracy is the best system has fallen from 81% across the comparable group of countries in 2024 to 68% in 2026 (though the question was asked in a slightly different way).

The appetite for strong leadership is, perhaps surprisingly, strongest among the comfortable; higher-income respondents endorse it more than lower-income ones (47% against 35%), and at the level of countries, economic anxiety and authoritarian preference do not move together — Argentina records the highest economic insecurity in the survey, with 68% worried they will not cover basic needs in the coming year, yet only average support for a strong leader (Argentina 38%, average 40%). And the generational picture is more tangled than the familiar alarm about the young would suggest; older respondents are markedly more supportive of democracy (76% of those over 50, against 60% of those under 35), and the under-35s lean slightly further towards strong-leader support (41% against 37%).



The apparent erosion of faith in democracy is concerning, but those who argue it is simply a matter of disillusioned, frustrated young people and the economically precarious are missing the bigger picture; frustration reaches into the comfortable centre of these societies. For those who value democracy, it needs to be defended in the court of public opinion day in and day out.

To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with the following statements about [COUNTRY]?

(Strongly / Tend to agree)	Global Avg.	Gender		Age			Household income			Political Affiliation		Subjective social status		
		M	F	<35	35-49	50-74	Low	Med	High	Left wing	Right wing	Low	Med	High
[Country] would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	40%	41%	40%	41%	43%	37%	35%	41%	47%	34%	49%	37%	38%	52%
A democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern [Country]	68%	69%	67%	60%	69%	76%	61%	70%	73%	75%	71%	63%	68%	71%

Figure 19. Support for democracy and authoritarianism

Vs average of 17 G20 countries surveyed ■ ≥ 5% higher ■ ≥ 5% lower

To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with the following statements about [COUNTRY]?

(Strongly / Tend to agree)	Global Average	Argentina	Australia	Brazil	Canada	France	Germany	India	Indonesia	Italy	Japan	Mexico	South Africa	South Korea	Sweden	Türkiye	Great Britain	United States
A democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern [Country].	68%	71%	73%	63%	68%	65%	67%	71%	69%	66%	49%	65%	70%	71%	74%	64%	76%	68%
[Country] would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.	40%	38%	34%	51%	25%	35%	29%	61%	77%	30%	46%	49%	53%	33%	21%	45%	29%	26%

Figure 20. Support for democracy and authoritarianism across all countries

Vs average of 17 G20 countries surveyed ■ ≥ 5% higher ■ ≥ 5% lower

5. A blocked society

5.1 The weakest link, and where to begin

The findings of the survey describe a dysfunctional world with a fractured social contract. Is the contract broken beyond repair? The mandate that Earth4All has documented since 2021 is intact: supermajorities want economic change, majorities support strong climate action, and democracy remains the preferred system of government. But trust in the state to act for the long term has collapsed to deeply concerning levels, dangerous levels even, given the imperative for long-term policies to stabilise Earth.

We can view division in society not only as a cause of dysfunction, though it is clearly that, but also as a symptom of the deeper problem: a fractured social contract and the resulting collapse of trust in government. People sense fierce tension between political parties (71%), a manifestation of the culture wars. But that may stand in for the tension about everything politics has failed to resolve.⁴⁴ Certainly, populist leaders the world over win substantial support on a message of tearing apart government and undermining elites. But our survey data convey a more hopeful account than the language of polarisation suggests: the publics of the G20 are not split into irreconcilable halves but pulled apart at identifiable points such as the distribution of the costs of transformative change.

The implication for the just transition is therefore one of repair. The case for systemic change has been won; the public agrees there is too much inequality, that the system is rigged and that the economy must change. What has not been secured is the public's confidence that the state can be trusted to manage the transition fairly and to deliver it over time — through long-term cross-party support in democracies. In the world's largest economies, the work must begin to build new social contracts for the 21st century.

The basis of a new social contract must be a credible programme of economic systems change^{45,46} that answers the three deficits this report has traced — the distribution deficit, the recognition deficit and the hope deficit — by making the settlement fairer, sharing the cost of transition visibly, and offering a credible prospect that the lives of the majority will get better. On that foundation, and only on that foundation, can a society rebuild the long-term trust on which planetary stewardship ultimately depends.

6. Country summaries



6.1 Argentina

A total of 501 adults aged 18–75 participated in the survey from Argentina, which was fielded in Spanish.

The mandate for change

The Argentine public reported higher levels of concern about economic inequality and their own economic situation than the global average, in common with other countries in the upper-middle income group. 76% agree that there is too much economic inequality in Argentina (rising to 82% for individuals over 50 years old). And out of all countries, they record the highest economic insecurity in the survey, with 68% worried they will not cover basic needs in the coming year. According to a 2026 report by Observatorio de la Deuda Social Argentina (ODSA), when asked about the main problem affecting them at a personal or family level, an overwhelming majority of Argentinians cite economic reasons: “money does not stretch far enough”.⁴⁷

Left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to perceive that there is too much economic inequality (93%). According to the Observatorio de Psicología Social Aplicada (OPSA) Monitor de Inseguridad (Insecurity Monitor) in 2026, “wide socio-economic inequality between rich and poor” is identified as the second driver of insecurities (76%), behind poverty and marginalisation (82%), by left-wing voting respondents (only 14% for right-wing voters).⁴⁸

78% of Argentines agreed that major changes to Argentina’s economic system are needed to improve life for most people (above the global average of 69%), with left-leaning political party respondents more likely to agree (92%).

Looking at the climate mandate, 56% agree that the government should take strong action, even if this leads to higher prices, with just 14% disagreeing. Again the agreement is higher among left-leaning political party respondents (81%), compared to 47% for the right-leaning.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 7 in 10 (71%) Argentines agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, in line with the global average. Only 9% disagreed. Left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree (88%) compared to right-leaning political party respondents (62%).

Tensions were perceived to be highest between:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 81% agreed, above the global average (71%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 69% agreed, above the global average (63%). Left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree (80%).

Tensions were perceived to be relatively low between:

- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Argentina: 46% agreed, below the global average (62%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 45% agreed, below the global average (53%). Left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to perceive tension (62%) compared to right-leaning political party respondents (37%).

The political system

The Argentine public were more supportive of the government than most other countries, in common with most others in the upper-middle-income group. Overall, 39% trust Argentina's government to act for the long term. Still, this represents a significant drop from 52% in the 2024 Earth for All Survey, while the proportion of respondents that do not trust their government to act for the long term has increased from 30% in 2024 to 37% in 2026.

Left-leaning political party respondents showed less trust in government (13%), compared to right-leaning political party respondents (61%). Government support was also a significant 10 points stronger for men (44%) than women (34%).

The Argentine public was in line with the G20 average in terms of support for moving to a more authoritarian style of government, with 38% agreeing that Argentina would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, and 27% disagreeing. But care is needed in interpreting this support. Support for democracy, on the other hand, is high, with 71% agreeing that a democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern Argentina, with only 7% disagreeing. Younger respondents (under-35s) were less likely to be supportive of a democratic political system than older respondents (50+) (58% and 81%, respectively). Left-leaning political party respondents also showed greater preference for a democratic political system (83%). Still, we can note a significant decline from the 2024 results, which recorded an 88% support for democracy.

Argentina's government can be trusted to make long-term decisions that will benefit the majority of people 20 or 30 years from now.




Figure 21: Long-term trust in government in Argentina

6.2 Australia

A total of 1,000 adults aged 18–65 participated in the survey from Australia, which was fielded in English.



The mandate for change

The Australian public reported lower levels of concern about economic inequality compared to the global average, consistent with other high-income countries. Over half of respondents (64%) agreed that there is too much economic inequality in Australia, significantly below the global average of 70% but a slight increase from 2024. However, the Australian public matched the global average for economic anxiety, with 41% worried they will not cover basic needs in the coming year. Younger respondents (under 35) were less likely to agree that there is economic inequality (56%) than the average.

Most of the Australian public (71%) agreed that major changes to Australia's economic system are needed to improve life for most people (slightly above the global average of 69%).

Just over one in two Australians (52%) agree that their government should take strong action to tackle climate change even if this leads to higher prices, with 20% disagreeing. Left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree (67%) than right-leaning respondents (40%).

Just over a third (39%) of Australians agree they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, slightly above the global average (36%), while 32% disagreed. Significantly, males, high-income respondents and right-leaning political party respondents were far more likely to agree with this statement (47%, 50% and 51%, respectively), compared to females (32%), low-income respondents (36%) and left-leaning respondents (38%).

Tensions and divisions

Overall, two thirds (67%) of Australians agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, matching the global average. Only 10% disagreed. Respondents aged 50+ (80%) and those with low education (70%) were more likely to agree.

Tensions were perceived to be relatively high between:

- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Australia: 70% agreed, significantly above the global average (62%). Right-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree (81%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 59% agreed, significantly above the global average (53%).

Perceptions of tensions were more in line with other countries between:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 69% agreed, in line with the global average (71%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 59% agreed, below the global average (63%).

The political system

Half of the Australian public (50%) said they are treated with respect and dignity, significantly above the global average of 41%. High-income households were more likely to agree (67%). In contrast, only one fifth (25%) of respondents with low perceived social status agreed with this.

The Australian public also showed moderate trust in government, with 33% agreeing that Australia's government can be trusted to act for the long term, in line with the global average of 31%, although 40% disagreed. Trust in government was lower among respondents aged 50+ (22%) and among those with low perceived social status (18%). In contrast, left-leaning political party respondents showed more trust in government (44%).

The Australian public showed strong support for democracy and rejection of authoritarianism. Only 34% agreed that Australia would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, significantly below the global average of 40%, with 36% disagreeing. However, right-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree that Australia would be better off with a more authoritarian style of government (46%), as were respondents with a lower education (41%).

In contrast, 73% agreed that a democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern Australia, significantly above the global average (68%), with only 5% disagreeing. Those aged 50+ were more likely to favour a democratic system (83%), while those with low education were less likely to agree (57%).

Australia's government can be trusted to make long-term decisions

that will benefit the majority of people 20 or 30 years from now.




Figure 22: Long-term trust in government in Australia



6.3 Brazil

A total of 1,001 adults aged 18–60 participated in the survey from Brazil, which was fielded in Portuguese. Given lower internet penetration in Brazil, the sample represents a more urban, educated and digitally connected population.

The mandate for change

Brazilians agreed more strongly than any other country that there is too much economic inequality — with 79% in agreement. Similarly high was the concern about having enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, with 66% of Brazilians agreeing with this statement. These are both significantly above the global averages (of 70% and 41%, respectively), which is consistent with other upper-middle-income countries. According to the Datafolha Economy & Society report from March 2026, the proportion of respondents thinking that the Brazilian economy will improve in the next few months decreased by 16 points, while the proportion thinking that their personal economy will improve in the next few months decreased by 9 points compared to December 2025.⁴⁹ The lesser educated are more likely to be optimistic about the future of Brazil's economy (39%), compared to 25% for the more educated. Similarly, 71% agreed that the economic system in Brazil is rigged to benefit the rich and powerful (above the global average of 65%). Interestingly, low-income households were less likely to agree (67%) that there is too much economic inequality. The majority of respondents with high education, however, tended to agree (91%).

The majority of the Brazilian public (68%) agreed that major changes to Brazil's economic system are needed, in line with the global average (69%). Low-income households were less likely to agree (55%), compared to high-income households (80%). Respondents with a high level of education were also more likely to agree (81%).

Looking at the Brazilian climate mandate, 57% of respondents agreed that their government should take strong action now, even if this leads to higher prices, with 15% disagreeing. This is slightly above the global average (54%). Low-income households showed less support for costs being passed onto the public (43%), compared to high-income households, who tended to be more open to this (68%). Further, left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree that the government should act even if it leads to higher prices (74%).

Just over one in three Brazilians (34%) agree that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, slightly below the global average (36%), while 36% disagreed. Highly educated respondents were more likely to disagree (46%), as were high-income household respondents (45%). Political party affiliation did not significantly correlate with the results.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 7 in 10 (70%) agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, slightly above the global average of 67%. Only 8% disagreed. Low-income households were less likely to agree (59%), compared to high-income households (81%).

Tensions were perceived to be highest between:

- Supporters of different political parties: 77% agreed, above the global average (71%). Respondents with a high level of income and of education were more likely to see tension (85% and 89%, respectively).
- People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 67% agreed, above the global average (63%).

- People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 56% agreed, above the global average (53%). Left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree with the statement (68%) than right-leaning respondents (58%).

Tensions were perceived to be notably low between:

- Immigrants and people born in Brazil: only 38% agreed, significantly below the global average (62%).

The political system

The Brazilian public showed slightly higher trust in government than the global average (31%), with 35% agreeing that Brazil's government can be trusted to act for the long term (a 2-point decrease compared to 2024), though 37% disagreed.

Left-leaning political party respondents and those with high perceived social status were more likely to trust government (60% and 45%, respectively). Brazilian respondents showed relatively high support for a more authoritarian style of government, with 51% agreeing that Brazil would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, significantly above the global average of 40% and an 8-point increase from 2024, while only 22% disagreed. However, we should not interpret this as a rejection of democracy.

63% of Brazilians agree that a democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern Brazil. While below the global average (68%), only 11% disagreed. Support for democracy is confirmed further by a survey conducted in 2025 by Datafolha and commissioned by the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB), which found that 74% of the population considers democracy to always be better than any other form of government, a number they highlighted to be the highest since the beginning of the survey series in 1989.⁵⁰

Respondents under the age of 35 and those from low-income households were less likely to agree that democracy is the best way to govern (52% and 48%, respectively), compared to those aged over 50 and individuals from high-income households, who were more likely to agree (73% and 79%).




Figure 23: Support for a strong leader who does not bother with elections in Brazil

6.4 Canada

A total of 1,001 adults aged 18–75 participated in the survey from Canada, which was fielded in English and French.



The mandate for change

The Canadian public reported lower levels of concern about economic inequality than the global average, consistent with other high-income countries. Canada had the lowest agreement of all countries surveyed, that there is too much economic inequality (61%), significantly below the global average of 70% and 3 percentage points under the 2024 levels. Similarly, only 56% agreed that the economic system is rigged to benefit the wealthy, significantly below the global average of 65% and 5 percentage points less than in 2024. Moreover, only a third (33%) worried about having enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, below the global average (41%). Overall attitudes towards the household finances are more optimistic than the attitudes towards the financial situation of the country according to the 2026 Leger Economic Confidence Report.⁵¹

In our survey, the Canadian public showed less support for economic system change, with only 62% agreeing that major changes to Canada's economic system are needed, below the global average of 69%.

Only 44% of Canadians agree that their government should take strong action on climate change, even if this leads to higher prices, with 20% disagreeing. This ranks significantly below the global average (54%). Those with a high level of education and left-leaning political party respondents were more keen to act against climate change, despite potential increases in costs (56% and 55%, respectively). Right-leaning political party respondents showed less support for this (30%).

Agreement that individuals shouldn't have to change their own lifestyles to address climate change, since that responsibility lies with governments and large corporations, was also below the global average of 36%. Only 32% agreed, while 36% disagreed. Right-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree (44%).

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 67% of the Canadian public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, exactly matching the global average. Only 10% disagreed.

Tensions were perceived to be relatively low or in line with the average across most categories:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 65% agreed, below the global average (71%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 56% agreed, below the global average (63%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Canada: 63% agreed, in line with the global average (62%). Right-leaning political party respondents were more likely to perceive tension (77%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 50% agreed, below the global average (53%).

The political system

The Canadian public showed moderate trust in government, with 33% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long-term, in line with the global average of 31%, though 31% disagreed. Trust has slightly improved since 2024, when 29% trusted the government to make long-term decisions and 45% disagreed. Additionally, in the 2026 wave, 46% agreed that people are treated with respect and dignity, above the global average of 41%. However, this agreement fell among low-income households and respondents with low education (39% and 37%, respectively).

The Canadian public showed the second strongest rejection of authoritarianism of all countries surveyed, with only 25% agreeing that Canada would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, significantly below the global average of 40% and the 2024 figure of 32%, while 38% disagreed. The level of support for democracy matches the global average (68%), with 68% agreeing that a democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern, and only 6% disagreed. Respondents below the age of 35 were less likely to agree (56%), compared to respondents aged 50+ (78%). Right-leaning political party respondents were also more likely to believe in a democratic political system (79%), breaking with the global pattern of stronger support among left-leaning political respondents.




Figure 24: Prioritising climate action in Canada

6.5 France

A total of 1,001 adults aged 18–55 participated in the survey from France, which was fielded in French.



The mandate for change

The French public reported high levels of concern about economic inequality, with 77% agreeing that there is too much, which is significantly higher than the global average of 70%, and an 8-point increase from 2024. Similarly, 66% agreed that the economic system in France is rigged to benefit the rich, in line with the global average of 65%, with left-leaning political party respondents more likely to agree (79%). However, only 27% of the public surveyed expressed worry that they will not have enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, significantly below the global average of 41%. Still, according to *Fractures Françaises 2025*, 36% cite purchasing power as one of the two issues they are personally most concerned about, the highest among the 14 issues proposed by the surveyor.⁵²

Most French respondents strongly agreed that major changes to France's economic system are needed (77%), significantly above the global average of 69%, and an increase from the 71% recorded in the 2024 survey.

With regard to climate, 47% of the French public agreed that their government should take strong action even if this leads to higher prices, below the global average (54%), while 23% disagreed. In turn, 36% agreed that people such as them should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as that is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, exactly matching both the global average and the proportion of disagreements to the statement.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, an overwhelming 82% of French respondents agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago. This is the highest proportion of all countries surveyed, significantly above the global average of 67%, and only 4% disagreed.

Tensions were perceived to be high between:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 85% agreed, significantly above the global average (71%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 70% agreed, above the global average (63%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in France: 70% agreed, above the global average (62%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 59% agreed, above the global average (53%).

The political system

The French public have a shockingly low trust in government, with only 13% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term (the lowest of all countries surveyed and well below the global average of 31%). Additionally, 65% disagreed — the highest level of disagreement across all countries surveyed. This trust crisis has worsened; in 2024, 19% agreed that the government can be trusted to make long-term decisions and 59% disagreed. According to *Fractures Françaises*, in 2025, 66% agreed that most politicians are corrupt, with 87% agreeing that politicians act first and foremost to benefit their own personal interests.⁵²

In our 2026 survey, the French public showed a moderate rejection of authoritarianism, with 35% agreeing that France would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, a 10-percentage-point hike from the 2024 results but still below the global average (40%), while 32% disagreed. Right-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree (49%). Looking at support for a democratic political system, 65% agree that a democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern — slightly below the global average of 68%, with 7% disagreeing. This is also a drop from 76% in 2024.

France's government
can be trusted to make long-term decisions
that will benefit the majority of people 20 or 30 years from now.




Figure 25: Long-term trust in government in France

6.6 Germany

A total of 1,001 adults aged 18–65 participated in the survey from Germany, which was fielded in German.



The mandate for change

The German public reported higher levels of concern about economic inequality than the global average (70%), despite being a high-income country, with 74% agreeing that there is too much economic inequality (an 11-point increase compared to 2024). Similarly, 68% agreed that the economic system in Germany is rigged to benefit the wealthy, above the global average of 65%. However, only 37% worry about having enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, below the global average of 41%. According to an ARD-DeutschlandTREND survey from February 2026, the “large social disparities / gap between rich and poor” are the main reason respondents cite for justifying why Germany is an unfair country, a 13-point increase from their 2025 results (22% in 2025 to 35% in 2026).⁵³

The majority of the German public agreed that Germany’s economic system needs major changes (69%), matching the global average of 69%.

Nearly half of respondents (46%) agreed that their government should be taking strong action on climate change, even if this leads to higher prices. This is below the global average (54%), with 24% disagreeing. Left-leaning political party respondents showed greater support for taking action on climate change even if this meant increased costs (64%), compared to right-leaning political party respondents (33%).

37% of Germans agreed that responsibility for climate action lies with governments and large corporations rather than individuals, in line with the global average of 36%. And 31% disagreed. Right-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree (47%), confirming that perceptions of who bears responsibility for climate action differ across political ideologies.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 79% of the German public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, significantly above the global average of 67%. Only 4% disagreed. High-income households showed a stronger belief that Germany is more divided (91%). Respondents from a low-education background, however, tended to see this less (61%).

Tensions were perceived to be high across all categories:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 76% agreed, above the global average (71%). Respondents aged 50+ were more likely to perceive tension (82%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Germany: 75% agreed, significantly above the global average (62%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 69% agreed, above the global average (63%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 66% agreed, significantly above the global average (53%).

The political system

The German public showed shockingly low trust in government, with only 19% agreeing that Germany’s government can be trusted to act for the long term, a stark decrease from the 26% in 2024 and significantly below the global average of 31%, with 55% disagreeing.

Respondents from Germany showed a strong rejection of authoritarianism, with only 29% agreeing that Germany would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, significantly below the global average of 40% and a decrease of 5 points compared to 2024, while 38% disagreed. Left-leaning political party supporters were less likely to agree (19%). On the other hand, 67% agree that a democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern, in line with the global average (68%), with only 6% disagreeing. Respondents under 35 were less likely to agree (56%).




Figure 26: Perceived tension in Germany



6.7 Great Britain

A total of 1,001 adults aged 18–55 participated in the survey from Great Britain, which was fielded in English.

The mandate for change

The British public reported levels of concern about economic inequality in line with the global average (70% in agreement that there is too much economic inequality), though with less personal economic anxiety, typical of high-income countries. 68% agreed that the economic system is rigged to benefit the rich and powerful, above the global average of 65% and a 3-point increase from 2024. However, only 38% showed concern about having enough money to cover basic needs over the coming year, below the global average of 41%. According to a 2026 report by the Office for National Statistics, the cost of living is the most frequently reported issue facing the UK (89%), despite 70% of adults stating that their household income covers their household's minimum living expenses.⁵⁴

Right-leaning political party respondents were less likely to agree that there is economic inequality in Great Britain (56%), and they also showed less belief that the system is rigged (53%), compared to left-leaning political party respondents (78%).

Most British respondents agreed that the economic system needs major changes (73%), above the global average of 69%.

One in two Britons (50%) agreed that their government should take strong action on climate change, even if this leads to higher prices. While below the global average (54%), less than one in four (23%) disagreed. Left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree (67%), while right-leaning political party respondents were less keen on prices being passed on to the public (31%). 35% of the British public agreed that people like them should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, in line with the global average (36%), while 40% disagreed. Right-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree (45%).

Tensions and divisions

Overall, an overwhelming 80% of British respondents agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago (the second highest result only after France), significantly above the global average of 67%. Only 6% disagreed.

Tensions were perceived to be relatively high between:

- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Great Britain: 77% agreed, significantly above the global average (62%).
- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 76% agreed, above the global average (71%). According to a 2025 Ipsos UK survey, 55% regard the differences in political views as potentially harmful to society.⁵⁴
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 63% agreed, matching the global average (63%). Left-leaning political party respondents tended to agree more (71%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 56% agreed, above the global average (53%).

The political system

The British public showed very low trust in government, with only 19% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term, significantly below the global average of 31% and a 4-point decrease from 2024, with 57% disagreeing. Right-leaning political party respondents were even less likely to show trust in government (10%).

The British public on the whole reject authoritarianism, with only 29% agreeing that the country would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, significantly below the global average of 40%, while 44% disagreed.

In line with this, more than three in four Britons (76%) agreed that a democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern, significantly above the global average (68%), and the highest support among all countries that were surveyed. Only 4% disagreed. According to Ipsos (2025), 75% of Britons are worried about the state of democracy in their country.⁵⁵

A democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in free and fair elections, is the best way to govern Great Britain




Figure 27: Support for democracy in Great Britain.

6.8 India



A total of 501 adults aged 18–55 participated in the survey from India, which was fielded in Hindi. Given lower internet penetration in India, the sample represents a more urban, educated and digitally connected population.

The mandate for change

The Indian public reported lower levels of concern about economic inequality (66% agreeing that there is too much) than the global average (70%), despite being a lower-middle-income country. Similarly, 64% agreed that the economic system is rigged to benefit the wealthy, in line with the global average of 65%. Only 39% said that they worry about not having enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, similar to the global average of 41%.

Interestingly, low-income households agree less that the system is rigged, compared to high-income households (48% and 71%, respectively). Most Indians agreed that the economic system needs major changes (72%), above the global average of 69%.

Nearly three quarters (71%) of Indians agreed that their government should take strong action on climate change, even if this leads to higher prices. This is significantly above the global average (54%) and the highest proportion expressed within the survey, with only 10% disagreeing. Left-leaning political party respondents were less likely to agree with the statement (59%) compared to right-leaning ones (75%). Interestingly, while this denotes an acceptability of a financial burden, that acceptability does not apply equally to lifestyles: 53% agreed that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, while 24% disagreed. This figure is significantly above the global average (36%) and again the highest of all countries surveyed. Left-leaning political party respondents were less likely to agree with costs being passed down to the public (40%).

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 61% of the Indian public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, below the global average of 67%. 18% disagreed.

Tensions were perceived to be moderate to high across categories:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 68% agreed, slightly below the global average (71%). High-income households showed higher agreement with this statement (74%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 64% agreed, in line with the global average (63%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in India: 64% agreed, similar to the global average (62%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 62% agreed, significantly above the global average (53%).

The political system

The Indian public showed high trust in government, with 59% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term, a significant drop from the 75% in 2024 but still well above the global average of 31% (37% in 2024). Right-leaning political party respondents showed more trust in government (70%), compared to left-leaning political party respondents (43%).

The Indian public showed strong support for authoritarianism, with 61% agreeing that India would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, (although this has dropped since 2024, where it was 71%). This is significantly above the global average of 40%, while only 17% disagreed. Respondents of high perceived social status tended to agree more (74%), compared to those of lower perceived social status (40%).

On the other hand, 71% agree that a democratic system is the best way to govern India, above the global average of 68%, with 10% disagreeing.

India would be better off having a **strong leader**
who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is...




Figure 28: Support for a strong leader who does not bother with elections in India.

6.9 Indonesia

A total of 1,001 adults aged 18–65 participated in the survey from Indonesia, which was fielded in Indonesian. Given lower internet penetration in Indonesia, the sample represents a more urban, educated and digitally connected population.

The mandate for change

The Indonesian public reported higher levels of concern about economic inequality than the global average, in common with most other upper-middle-income countries. Agreement that there is too much economic inequality was 73%, above the global average of 70%. Further, 74% agreed that the economic system is rigged to benefit the wealthy, significantly above the global average of 65%. However, only 31% showed concern that they would not have enough money to cover their basic needs over the next 12 months, significantly below the global average of 41%. This may reflect that the sample in Indonesia covers a higher-educated population.

Those of lower perceived social position were more likely to agree that there is too much economic inequality (82%) and that the system is rigged to benefit the rich (84%). In contrast, older respondents (50+) were among the least likely to agree that the system is rigged (65%).

An overwhelming majority of the Indonesian public agreed that the economic system needs major changes (78%), significantly above the global average of 69%, and Indonesia had the highest support for economic systems change out of all the countries surveyed.

Indonesians also ranked high on taking action on climate change, with 68% agreeing that their government should take strong action, even if this leads to higher prices (global average 54%). Only 5% disagreed. Again, the results will be affected by the sample being a relatively highly educated Indonesian public.

Similarly, under one in three Indonesians (32%) agreed that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, while 41% disagreed. This is below the global average (36%). Lower-income households were less likely to agree (23%) with this statement.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, only 53% of the Indonesian public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, significantly below the global average of 67%. Less than a fifth (18%) disagreed.

Tensions were perceived to be relatively low across most categories:


- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 67% agreed, below the global average (71%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Indonesia: 48% agreed, significantly below the global average (62%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 63% agreed, matching the global average (63%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 55% agreed, slightly above the global average (53%). Those with a lower level education tended to perceive less tension (28%).

The political system

The Indonesian public showed higher trust in government than most countries, with 40% agreeing that Indonesia’s government can be trusted to act for the long term, above the global average of 31%, though 28% disagreed. This finding was typical of other upper-middle-income countries, whereas high-income countries were more negative about their governments. Still, we register a drop of 23% in the proportion of Indonesians agreeing that the government can be trusted to make long-term decisions compared to the 2024 levels (63% agreed, 15% disagreed). Lower-income households showed lower levels of trust in the government to make long-term decisions (24%).

Finally, the Indonesian public showed the highest support of all countries for moving away from democracy, with 77% agreeing that Indonesia would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, with only 5% disagreeing. This was significantly above the global average of 40%. This is a huge increase from the numbers recorded in our 2024 survey, in which only 24% of Indonesians supported having a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections. In 2026, older respondents (50+) showed the greatest support for this statement (84%).

In line with the global average (68%), 69% of Indonesians agreed that a democratic political system is the best way to govern Indonesia, with only 5% disagreeing.



6.10 Italy

A total of 1,001 adults aged 21–65 participated in the survey from Italy, which was fielded in Italian.



The mandate for change

The Italian public reported higher levels of concern about economic inequality (73% agreed that there is too much) than the global average (70%) but had a low personal economic anxiety typical of high-income countries. The number of people who think there is too much inequality has risen from 61% recorded in 2024. Similarly, in 2024, 55% agreed that the economic system in Italy hurts people who have least money, below the 2024 global average (61%). This has risen to 61% of Italians in 2026 who agree that the economic system is rigged to benefit the rich and powerful, below the global average of 65%. A majority of the Italian public also agreed that the economic system needs major changes (68%), in line with the global average of 69%.

One in four Italians surveyed (24%) agreed that they worry about not having enough money to cover basic needs over the next year. This is the lowest across all 17 countries surveyed and significantly below the global average of 41%. According to the 2026 Eurispes Rapporto Italia, 48% of Italians expect the Italian economy to worsen over the next 12 months, an 11-point increase from 2025.56

Left-leaning political party respondents and respondents with low perceived social position showed higher levels of agreement on economic inequality (85% and 86%, respectively). They also showed more agreement that the economic system in Italy is rigged (75% and 79%, respectively).

Less than one in two Italians (41%) agreed that people are treated with respect and dignity, matching the global average.

Looking at the Italian mandate for climate action, over one in two Italians (54%) agreed that their government should take strong action, even if this leads to higher prices, matching the global average (54%), while 16% disagreed. Those with high perceived social position showed greater agreement (70%).

Additionally, 32% agreed that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, below the global average (36%), while 35% disagreed.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 66% of the Italian public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, in line with the global average of 67%. Only 8% disagreed. Respondents with low perceived social position and those aged over 50 tended to show greater agreement (79% and 72%, respectively).

Italian perceptions of tensions between different groups were close to global averages across all categories:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 68% agreed, slightly below the global average (71%). Older respondents (50+) perceived higher tension (75%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Italy: 66% agreed, above the global average (62%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 59% agreed, below the global average (63%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 49% agreed, below the global average (53%).

The political system

The Italian public surveyed showed low trust in government, with only 22% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term, significantly below the global average of 31%, with 40% disagreeing. It is worth noting that this was a common position held across other high-income countries. The 2026 Edelman Trust Barometer shows that the government is the least trusted institution (competence score) across both high- and low-income respondents in Italy.²⁴ Right-leaning political party respondents and respondents with high perceived social position showed greater trust in government (35% and 40%, respectively).

The 2026 Eurispes Italy Report surveyed Italians' attitudes towards establishing a Ministry for the Future; while a small majority (55%) disagree, among the 45% who agree, it is mostly and unsurprisingly young people who are in favour (63%).⁵⁶

The Italian public showed moderate support for authoritarianism, with only a third (30%) agreeing that Italy would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, significantly below the global average of 40%, while 39% disagreed. Again, right-leaning political party respondents and respondents with high perceived social position showed greater agreement (41% and 40%, respectively).

On the other hand, 66% agreed that a democratic political system is the best way to govern Italy, in line with the global average (68%), while 8% disagreed. Left-leaning political party respondents showed particularly high levels of agreement (79%).



Figure 30: Perception of economic inequality in Italy

6.11 Japan

A total of 1,001 adults aged 18–65 participated in the survey from Japan, which was fielded in Japanese.



The mandate for change

The Japanese public reported lower levels of concern about economic inequality (63% agreed that there is too much) than the global average of 70%, consistent with other high-income countries. However, this is a five-point increase from 2024. Left-leaning political party respondents and those with low perceived social position showed higher agreement (77% and 76%, respectively).

Similarly, only 55% agreed that the economic system is rigged to benefit the wealthy. This is significantly below the global average of 65%, and the lowest of all the countries surveyed. In 2024 only 38% agreed that the economic system in Japan hurts people who have the least money, also way below the global average of 61%. Ipsos reports in February 2026 show that poverty and social inequality is the most reported worry in Japan (32%), level with inflation.⁵⁷

In our survey, personal economic concern was in line with the average, with 39% agreeing that they worry they will not have enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months (global average 41%).

Left-leaning political party respondents showed greater agreement that the system is rigged (72%). Similarly, older respondents (50+) tended to agree more with this statement (62%) than younger respondents (under 35, 39%).

The Japanese public showed the least support for economic system change among all countries surveyed, with only 53% agreeing that major changes to Japan's economic system are needed, significantly below the global average of 69%.

On climate, the Japanese are the least supportive of the statement that people should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, with only 30% of agreement, below the global average (36%), while 25% disagreed.

Japan is also the least supportive country for placing the financial burden on individuals, with only 36% agreeing that their government should take strong action on climate change, even if this leads to higher prices, significantly below the global average (54%), with 19% disagreeing.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 46% of the Japanese public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, significantly below the global average of 67%. 11% disagreed. Left-leaning political party respondents tended to agree more with this statement (74%).

Tensions were perceived to be low across all categories, a point of difference from other high-income countries, where perceptions of tensions tended to be high:


- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: only 36% agreed, well below the global average (71%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 48% agreed, significantly below the global average (63%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Japan: 48% agreed, significantly below the global average (62%). Still, a 2025 survey by The Yomiuri Shimbun and Waseda University shows increasing concerns linked to immigration, with the most cited concerns being “public safety will deteriorate” and “troubles will arise due to differences in language, culture and customs”.⁵⁸
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: only 34% agreed, significantly below the global average (53%).

The political system

One fifth of the Japanese public (20%) agreed that they are treated with respect and dignity, both significantly below the global average of 41% and the lowest of all countries. Trust in government was also low, with only 19% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term, significantly below the global average of 31%, with 43% disagreeing. Similarly, the 2026 Edelman Trust Barometer ranked Japan lowest of their Trust Index (38%), for both high- (44%) and low-income respondents (31%).⁵⁹ Still, this trust level is an improvement from the results of our 2024 survey, where only 12% of the respondents from Japan said they trusted their government to make long-term decisions, with 56% disagreeing, and 14% agreed that their government can be trusted to make decisions for the benefit of the majority of people. Right-leaning political party respondents and those with high perceived social position showed substantially more trust in government (32% and 37%, respectively).

Surprisingly, the Japanese public showed relatively strong support for authoritarianism, a point of difference with other high-income countries. Nearly half (46%) of them agreed that Japan would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections (an increase from 42% in 2024), above the global average of 40%, while 20% disagreed. Right-leaning political party respondents tended to agree more (58%). In line with this, only 50% agreed that a democratic system is the best way to govern Japan, significantly below the global average (68%), with 10% disagreeing.

My country would be better off having a **strong leader** who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.



A democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in **free and fair** elections, is the best way to govern my country




Figure 31: Support for strong leaders and democracy in Japan



6.12 Mexico

A total of 501 adults aged 18–55 participated in the survey from Mexico, which was fielded in Spanish. Given lower internet penetration in Mexico, the sample represents a more urban, educated and digitally connected population.

The mandate for change

The Mexican public reported moderate levels of concern about economic inequality but high personal economic anxiety, consistent with other upper-middle-income countries. Similar to the global average of 70%, 68% of Mexicans agreed that there is too much economic inequality, which is a decrease from the 77% recorded in our 2024 survey. Similarly, 61% agreed that the economic system in Mexico is rigged (below the global average of 65%). However, 53% said that they worry that they will not have enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, significantly above the global average of 41%. This was even higher (64%) among right-leaning political party respondents. According to the Ipsos What Worries the World survey in January 2026, “poverty and inequality” rank third at 28% in the issues that Mexicans find most worrying, behind “crime and violence” (32%) and “inflation” (29%).⁶⁰

In our survey, the Mexican public showed support for system change at levels similar to the global average. A majority agreed that the economic system needs major changes (71%), similar to the global average of 69%.

With regard to climate, 59% of Mexicans agreed that their government should take strong action, even if this leads to higher prices. This is above the global average (54%), with only 11% disagreeing. 40% agreed that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, above the global average (36%), while 28% disagreed.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 59% of the Mexican public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, below the global average of 67%. 11% disagreed.

Tensions were perceived to be moderate across most categories:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 71% agreed, matching the global average (71%). Older respondents (50+) and high-income households tended to perceive higher tension (83% in both instances).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 60% agreed, slightly below the global average (63%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Mexico: 58% agreed, below the global average (62%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 52% agreed, slightly below the global average (53%). Respondents of high perceived social position were more likely to agree with this statement (66%).


The political system

The Mexican public showed moderate trust in government, with 35% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term, above the global average of 31%, though 34% disagreed. In 2024, 44% agreed, marking a significant decrease in trust — for comparison, the global average trust

dropped by 6 points. Additionally, 47% agreed that they are treated with respect and dignity, above the global average of 41%.

In common with other upper-middle-income countries, there was support for authoritarianism; just under half (49%) of the Mexican public agreed that they would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, significantly above the global average of 40%, while only 16% disagreed. Support for democracy is at 65%, which is slightly below the global average (68%), while 9% disagreed. Respondents aged 50+ showed the highest level of agreement with a democratic political system (80%).

My country would be better off having a **strong leader** who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.



A democratic political system, where leaders are chosen in **free and fair** elections, is the best way to govern my country




Figure 32: Support for strong leaders and democracy in Mexico.



6.13 South Africa

A total of 500 adults aged 18–55 participated in the survey from South Africa, which was fielded in English. Given lower internet penetration in South Africa, the sample represents a more urban, educated and digitally connected population.

The mandate for change

The South African public reported significantly higher levels of concern about economic inequality and their own economic situation than the global average, consistent with other upper-middle-income countries. Agreement that there is too much economic inequality was particularly high (78%), second only to Brazil and significantly above the global average of 70%, yet a drop from the 85% recorded in our 2024 survey. Right-leaning political party respondents showed higher levels of agreement (87%).

The majority (76%) agreed that the economic system is rigged to benefit the wealthy — the highest proportion of all countries surveyed and well above the global average of 65%. Additionally, 46% said that they worry they will not have enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, above the global average of 41%.

The over-50s are more inclined to agree that the system is rigged (83%). And in 2024, 83% of South Africans agreed that the economic system hurts people who have the least money.

Most of the South African public strongly agreed that the economic system needs major changes (77%), significantly above the global average of 69%. In 2024 already, 50% of South Africans thought the economic system needed to be completely reformed, and an additional 41% thought it needed major changes — the third highest calls to reform in the 21 countries surveyed.

Support is also clear on climate action; 64% of South Africans agreed that their government should take strong action, even if this leads to higher prices. This is significantly above the global average (54%), and only 15% disagreed. In line with the global average (36%), 35% also agreed that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, while 41% disagreed.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 67% of the South African public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, matching the global average. 15% disagreed. Respondents aged 50+ showed higher agreement with this statement (79%).

Tensions were perceived to be high across multiple categories:

- ▶ Immigrants and people born in South Africa: 81% agreed, significantly above the global average (62%). Older respondents (50+) perceived more tension (95%).
- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 76% agreed, above the global average (71%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 72% agreed, significantly above the global average (63%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 50% agreed, slightly below the global average (53%).

The political system

The South African public showed very low trust in government, with only 24% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term, significantly below the global average of 31%, and also the lowest level of trust in government of all upper-middle-income countries. According to the 2026 Edelman Trust Barometer, 33% of South Africans trust their government “to do what is right”, well below the global average (53%). Over half (54%) disagreed with this statement.⁶¹ In our survey, only 36% agreed that they are treated with respect and dignity, below the global average of 41%. Trust in government was particularly low among respondents with low perceived social positioning (10%).

The South African public showed high support for authoritarianism, with over half (53%) agreeing that South Africa would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, significantly above the global average of 40%, while 24% disagreed. Support for democracy being the best way to govern was similar to the global average (68%) at 70%, with 13% disagreeing. Older respondents (50+) showed the greatest level of support for democracy (87%).

According to a 2025 survey by Afrobarometer, the belief that “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” is on the rise again (from 40% in 2021 to 49% in 2025), after a stark drop from 72% in 2011.⁶²

Major changes to the way South Africa's

economic system works

are needed to improve life for most people.




Figure 33: Support for economic system change in South Africa

6.14 South Korea

A total of 501 adults aged 18–65 participated in the survey from South Korea, which was fielded in Korean.



The mandate for change

The South Korean public reported moderate levels of concern about economic inequality, with mixed economic perspectives despite being a high-income country. 65% of South Koreans agreed that there is too much economic inequality, below the global average of 70% and only a slight increase from 2024 (61%). However, 68% agreed that the economic system in South Korea is rigged to benefit the wealthy, above the global average of 65%. But should the government do anything about it? According to the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA)(2025), the public perception that it is the government's role to reduce income inequality is at its lowest since 2014.⁶³

Additionally, in our survey, 43% said that they worry about having enough money to cover basic needs over the next year, similar to the global average (41%) but the highest of the high-income countries surveyed.

The majority of the South Korean public agreed that major changes to the economic system are needed (65%), although this was below the global average (69%).

Looking at the climate mandate, 55% of South Koreans agreed that their government should take strong action, even if this leads to higher prices, in line with the global average (54%), with only 12% disagreeing. In addition, 33% agreed that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, slightly below the global average (36%), while 38% disagreed.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 62% of the South Korean public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, below the global average of 67%. 10% disagreed.

Tensions varied across categories, and were either in line with the average (political party supporters, income levels) or perceived to be lower (immigration status or climate concern):

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 72% agreed, similar to the global average (71%). Respondents aged 50+ were more likely to perceive tension (81%). According to KIHASA (2025), the divide between progressives and conservatives is the most severe conflict perceived by South Koreans, and has been in 2018, 2023 and 2025.⁶³
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 64% agreed, also similar to the global average (63%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in South Korea: only 42% agreed, significantly below the global average (62%). Respondents with a lower education background showed the highest level of agreement (57%) with this statement.
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 42% agreed, significantly below the global average (53%).

According to Predictions 2026, 38% find it unlikely that “there will be a large-scale public unrest (such as protest or riots) in my country in 2026 to protest against the way the country is being run”, compared to 49% in 2019.⁶⁴

The political system

The South Korean public showed higher trust in government than most countries, with 37% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term, a 14-percentage-point increase from 2024. This figure is above the global average of 31%, and the highest of the high-income countries. A quarter (26%) disagreed, a 20-point drop from 2024. However, only 29% agreed they are treated with respect and dignity, significantly below the global average of 41%.

The South Korean public showed moderate rejection of authoritarianism; a third (33%) agreed that South Korea would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, below the global average of 40%, while 37% disagreed. Nearly three quarters (71%) agreed that a democratic political system is the best way to govern South Korea, above the global average (68%), with 8% disagreeing. Left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to show support for this statement (80%), compared to other groups.

The KIHASA 2025 Social Cohesion Survey suggests a positive correlation between the preference for democracy and the preference for welfare expansion.⁶³

South Korea's government
can be trusted to make long-term decisions
that will benefit the majority of people 20 or 30 years from now.




Figure 34: Long-term trust in government in South Korea



6.15 Sweden

A total of 501 adults aged 18–65 participated in the survey from Sweden, which was fielded in Swedish.

The mandate for change

The Swedish public reported moderate levels of concern about economic inequality but low personal economic anxiety, typical of high-income countries. 71% agreed that there is too much economic inequality, in line with the global average (70%) and an 8-point increase from 2024. Just over half of Swedes (57%) agreed that the economic system in Sweden is rigged to benefit the rich and powerful, significantly below the global average of 65%. Only 31% said that they worry that they will not have enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, significantly below the global average of 41%.

Those with perceived low social position were more likely to agree that the system is rigged to benefit the rich (80%) compared to other groups.

The Swedish public showed less support for economic system change than other countries, with 62% agreeing that major changes are needed, below the global average of 69%, although still high.

In regard to climate, one in two Swedes (50%) agreed that their government should take strong action, even if this leads to higher prices, below the global average (54%), and 24% disagreed. Right-leaning political party respondents were less keen for climate change action impacting prices (38%). While 32% agreed that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, this is below the global average (36%), and 41% disagreed.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 78% of the Swedish public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, significantly above the global average of 67%. Only 5% disagreed.

Tensions were perceived to be high in some areas but low in others:

- Supporters of different political parties: 73% agreed, similar to the global average (71%).
- Immigrants and people born in Sweden: 71% agreed, significantly above the global average (62%).

Where tensions were perceived to be lower:

- People with high incomes and people with low incomes: only 52% agreed, significantly below the global average (63%).
- People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 54% agreed, in line with the global average (53%).

The political system

The Swedish public showed relatively positive views of social treatment and government trust, with 58% agreeing that they are treated with respect and dignity, significantly above the global average of 41%. Trust in government was 33%, with the same percentage agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term (37% in 2024), slightly above the global average of 31%, though 41% disagreed. This level of trust was relatively high among high-income countries, despite a sharp drop in trust in government compared to 2024 (47%).

Right-leaning political party respondents were more likely to trust the government (45%). And those with perceived low social position were less likely to agree that they were treated with respect (37%). According to the 2026 Edelman Trust Barometer, those with low income are more likely to perceive the government as unethical and incompetent.⁶⁵

The Swedish public showed the strongest rejection of authoritarianism of all countries surveyed; only 21% agreed that Sweden would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, well below the global average of 40%, while 53% disagreed. On the other hand, 74% agreed that a democratic political system is the best way to govern Sweden, significantly above the global average (68%) while only 6% disagreed.




Figure 35: Support for strong leaders and democracy in Sweden.



6.16 Türkiye

A total of 501 adults aged 18–65 participated in the survey from Türkiye, which was fielded in Turkish. Given lower internet penetration in Türkiye, the sample represents a more urban, educated and digitally connected population.

The mandate for change

The Turkish public showed similar levels of concern as other countries on economic inequality but were more concerned about their personal economic circumstances, similar to other upper-middle-income countries. Agreement that there is too much economic inequality was 72%, in line with the global average of 70%, a decrease from 2024 (77%). On the other hand, 61% agreed that the economic system is rigged to benefit the wealthy, below the global average of 65%. In 2024 already, one in four surveyed (75%) agreed that the economic system in Türkiye hurts people who have the least money. Notably, in 2026, 52% said that they worry that they will not have enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, significantly above the global average of 41%.

Respondents aged 50+ showed greater agreement that there is too much inequality (83%), and higher agreement that the system is rigged to benefit the rich (74%), whereas low-income households showed the least agreement with this statement (38%). Low-income households were also more worried about being able to afford the essentials (70%).

Most of the Turkish public agreed that the economic system needs major changes (67%), similar to the global average of 69%.

Even if it leads to higher prices, 61% think that the government should take strong action on climate, significantly above the global average (54%), while only 13% disagreed. Respondents over 50 showed a greater level of agreement with this statement (73%).

A smaller proportion of people felt that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as that is the responsibility of governments and large corporations: 48% agreed, still significantly above the global average (36%), while 26% disagreed.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 66% of the Turkish public agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, in line with the global average of 67%. A very small portion (13%) disagreed. Older respondents were more likely to believe there is greater division in Türkiye (80%).

Tensions were perceived to be moderate to high across most categories:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 72% agreed, in line with the global average (71%). Those aged 50+ showed higher agreement (82%) than the average.
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 66% agreed, above the global average (63%). Those aged 50+ perceived higher tension (74%).
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in Türkiye: 65% agreed, above the global average (62%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 46% agreed, below the global average (53%).

The political system

The Turkish public showed a higher trust in government than most countries, with 39% agreeing that their government can be trusted to make long-term decisions for the benefit of the majority, a 9-percentage-point increase from 2024 and above the global average of 31%, though 37% disagreed (47% in 2024). This was similar to other upper-middle-income countries, which were generally more supportive of government. 42% of the Turkish respondents signalled that they are treated with respect and dignity, in line with the global average (41%).

Right-leaning political party respondents showed the highest trust in government (67%), whereas those aged 50+ showed the least trust in government (29%).

The Turkish public showed support for authoritarianism, with 45% agreeing that they would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, an increase from the 37% recorded in our 2024 survey, and above the global average of 40% in 2026, while 32% disagreed. Still, support for a democratic political system remains high with 64% agreeing, below the global average (68%), while 15% disagreed.




Figure 36: Long-term trust in government in Türkiye

6.17 United States of America

A total of 1,002 adults aged 18–65 participated in the survey from the United States, which was fielded in English.



The mandate for change

US respondents reported lower levels of concern about economic inequality than the global average, consistent with other high-income countries. Agreement that there is too much economic inequality was only 62% (63% in 2024), significantly below the global average of 70%. Slightly higher, 67% agreed that the economic system is rigged to benefit the rich, in line with the global average (65%). Only 35% said that they worry that they will not have enough money to cover basic needs over the next 12 months, below the global average of 41%.

Left-leaning political party respondents were more likely to agree that there is too much economic inequality (75%), compared to right-leaning political party respondents (49%). And there was a similar pattern between left- and right-leaning respondents on the belief that the system is rigged to benefit the rich; 83% of left-leaning political party respondents supported this statement, compared to 54% of right-leaning political party respondents.

According to the Wall Street Journal/NORC Poll from July 2025, over one in two US Americans (54%) are extremely or very concerned that economic growth doesn't benefit everyone equally, with 19% not very or not at all concerned.⁶⁶

The US public showed the least support for economic system change, with only 61% agreeing that major changes to the economic system are needed, significantly below the global average (69%).

On the climate mandate in the United States, one in two (51%) agreed that the government should take strong action, even if this leads to higher prices, slightly below the global average (54%), while 18% disagreed. There was a significant difference in agreement between left-leaning political party respondents and right-leaning political party respondents (67% and 38%, respectively).

Almost one in three (32%) agree that they should not have to change their lifestyles to address climate change as it is the responsibility of governments and large corporations, below the global average (36%), while 35% disagreed.

Tensions and divisions

Overall, 73% of the US respondents agreed that the country is more divided than it was 10 years ago, significantly above the global average of 67%. Only 8% disagreed.

Tensions were perceived to be high across multiple categories:

- ▶ Supporters of different political parties: 79% agreed, significantly above the global average (71%). High-income households (94%) tended to perceive more tension.
- ▶ Immigrants and people born in the United States: 69% agreed, above the global average (62%).
- ▶ People with high incomes and people with low incomes: 65% agreed, in line with the global average (63%).
- ▶ People who are very concerned about climate change and those who are sceptical: 60% agreed, significantly above the global average (53%). High-income households showed greater agreement with this statement (78%).

The political system

The US respondents showed low trust in government, with only 26% agreeing that their government can be trusted to act for the long term, significantly below the global average (31%) and an 11-percentage-point decrease compared to 2024 — although similar to other high-income countries — with 45% disagreeing. 39% agreed that they are treated with respect and dignity, in line with the global average (41%). According to the Pew Research Center (2025), the levels of government trust in the United States are at their lowest since the beginning of the surveying in 1958.⁶⁷

Almost half of respondents with high perceived position showed high trust in the government (49%), well above the country average (26%).

The US respondents showed a strong rejection of authoritarianism. Only about a quarter of them (26%) agreed that the United States would be better off having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, significantly below the global average of 40% and a huge decrease compared to the 2024 levels of 41%, while 40% disagreed. Close to half of respondents with high perceived social position agreed with this statement (45%).

On the other hand, the proportion of US respondents agreeing that a democratic political system is the best way to govern is level with the global average (68%), with only 6% disagreeing. High-income households showed greater preference for democracy (85%).




Figure 37: Prioritising climate action in the USA

7. References

1. Ipsos (2021). *Global Commons Survey: Attitudes to Transformation and Planetary Stewardship*. <https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/global-commons-survey-attitudes-transformation-and-planetary-stewardship>
2. Earth4All (2024). *The Earth for All 2024 Survey*. <https://earth4all.life/global-survey-2024/>
3. Rockström, J., Gupta, J., Qin, D. et al. (2023). Safe and just Earth system boundaries. *Nature* 619, 102–111. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06083-8>
4. Collste, D., Barbour, F., Callegari, B. et al. (2024). Modeling human wellbeing on a finite planet towards 2100 with Earth4All. Preprint (Version 2), available at Research Square. <https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3228512/v2>
5. Houle, C., Ruck, D. J., Bentley, R. A. & Gavrillets, S. (2022). Inequality between identity groups and social unrest. *Journal of The Royal Society Interface*, 19 (188). <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2021.0725>
6. De Juan, A. & Wegner, E. (2019). Social Inequality, State-centered Grievances, and Protest: Evidence from South Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 63, 31–58. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717723136>
7. D'Agostino, F., Gaus, G. & Thrasher, J. (2024). Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract. In Zalta, E. N. & Nodelman, U. (Eds.); *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
8. Loewe, M., Von Schiller, A., Zintl, T. & Leininger, J. (2024). *Social Contract and Social Cohesion: Synergies and Tensions between Two Related Concepts*. German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). <https://doi.org/10.23661/ipb3.2024>
9. United Nations (2025). *World Social Report: A New Policy Consensus to Accelerate Social Progress*. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. <https://social.desa.un.org/issues/world-social-report>
10. Chancel, L., Gómez-Carrera, R., Moshrif, R., Piketty, T., et al. (2026). *World Inequality Report 2026*. World Inequality Lab. https://wir2026.wid.world/www-site/uploads/2026/04/World_Inequality_Report_2026.pdf
11. Nord, M., Altman, D., Fernandes, T., Good God, A., & Lindberg, S. I. (2026). *Democracy Report 2026: Unraveling The Democratic Era?* University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute. https://www.v-dem.net/documents/75/V-Dem_Institute_Democracy_Report_2026_lowres.pdf
12. Burchi, F., Fiedler, C., Leininger, J. et al. (2025). (2025). Social Cohesion: A New Definition and a Proposal for Its Measurement in Africa. *Social Indicators Research*. 181 (13). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-025-03764-x>
13. OECD (2011), *Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World*. OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/persp_glob_dev-2012-en
14. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2023). *Social Cohesion: Concept and Measurement*. United Nations.
15. United Nations Development Programme (2020). *Strengthening social cohesion: Conceptual framing and programming implications*. United Nations Development Programme. <https://www.undp.org/publications/strengthening-social-cohesion-conceptual-framing-and-programming-implications>
16. Kirsten, F. & Bonga-Bonga, L. (2025). The Ties that Bind Us: How Social Cohesion and Institutional Quality Shape Subjective Well-Being in Africa. *Applied Research in Quality of Life*, 20 (2183–2200). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11482-025-10514-1>
17. Ainsaar, M., Nahkur, O. & Makarova, M. (2024). Social Tension Index. *Individual and Society*, 27 (2). <https://doi.org/10.31577/cas.2024.02.631>
18. Спицька, Л. (2020). Social Tension in Society and its Impact on Life. *Modern Engineering and Innovative Technologies*, 17–22. <https://doi.org/10.30890/2567-5273.2023-25-03-014>
19. Artemov, G., Aleinikov, A., Abgadzava, D., Pinkevich, A. & Abalian, A. (2017). Social Tension: the Possibility of Conflict Diagnosis (on the Example of St. Petersburg). *Economics & Sociology*, 10 (192–208).
20. Coser, L. A. (1957). Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 8 (197). <https://doi.org/10.2307/586859>
21. Mishra, S. N. & Mishra, S. (2002). Social Tensions/Conflicts and their Functions. *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, 48, (319–326). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0019556120020304>
22. Slyusarevskyy, M. M., Chunikhina, S. & Flaherty, M. (2021). Social Tension as a Macro Indicator of the Psychological Well-Being of Society. *Wiadomości Lekarskie*, 74(11) (2812–2817). <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35023498/>
23. United Nations (2026). *Counting What Counts: A Compass of Progress for People and Planet*. United Nations: High-Level Expert Group on Beyond GDP. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/high-level_expert_group_on_beyond_gdp_final_report.pdf

24. Edelman Trust Institute (2026). Edelman Trust Barometer: Trust Amid Insularity - Italy Report. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/it/2026-02/2026%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer_Italy%20Report.pdf
25. Wilkinson, R. G. & Pickett, K. (2009). *The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better*. Allen Lane.
26. Wilkinson, R.G. & Pickett, K. (2018). *The Inner Level: How More Equal Societies Reduce Stress, Restore Sanity and Improve Everyone's Well-Being*. Allen Lane.
27. Pickett, K., Wilkinson, R., Gauhar, A. & Sahni-Nicholas, P. (2024). *The Spirit Level at 15: The Enduring Impact of Inequality*. <https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/215026/> (2024) doi:10.15124/YAO-DE9S-7K93.
28. Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614934>
29. Rothstein, B. & Uslaner, E. M. (2005). All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust. *World Politics*, 58 (41–72).
30. Stiglitz, J. E. (2013). *The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future*. Norton & Company.
31. Piketty, T. (2020). *Capital and Ideology*. Harvard University Press.
32. Stiglitz, J. E., et al (2025). *G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality: Summary and Full Report*. G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202511/g20-global-inequality-report-full-and-summary.pdf
33. Honneth, A. (2005). *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Polity Press.
34. Sandel, M. J. (2020). *The Tyranny of Merit: What's Become of the Common Good?* Allen Lane.
35. Gidron, N. & Hall, P. A. (2017). The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right. *British Journal of Sociology*, 68, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12319>
36. Gidron, N. & Hall, P. A. (2020). Populism as a Problem of Social Integration. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53 (1027–1059). <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019879947>
37. Wike, R., Fagan, M., Huang, C., Clancy, L. & Lippert, J. (2025). Economic Inequality Seen as Major Challenge Around the World. *Pew Research Center*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/01/09/economic-inequality-seen-as-major-challenge-around-the-world/>
38. King's College London & The Policy Institute (2025). *The UK's changing 'culture wars': Division, tension and common ground*. King's College London & The Policy Institute. <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/uks-changing-culture-wars-division-tension-and-common-ground.pdf>
39. OECD (2026). *OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD)*. [Data set] [https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?bp=true&df\[ds\]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df\[id\]=DSD_WISE_IDD%40DF_IDD&df\[ag\]=OECD.WISE.INE&df\[vs\]=1.0&dq=A.INC_DISP_GINI...T.METH2012.D_CUR.&pd=2010,&pg=0&snb=6&tm=Income%20Distribution%20Database&to\[TIME_PERIOD\]=false](https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?bp=true&df[ds]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df[id]=DSD_WISE_IDD%40DF_IDD&df[ag]=OECD.WISE.INE&df[vs]=1.0&dq=A.INC_DISP_GINI...T.METH2012.D_CUR.&pd=2010,&pg=0&snb=6&tm=Income%20Distribution%20Database&to[TIME_PERIOD]=false)
40. Dutwin, D. & Buskirk, T. D. (2023). A Deeper Dive into the Digital Divide: Reducing Coverage Bias in Internet Surveys. *Social Science Computer Review*, 41 (1902–1920). <https://doi.org/10.1177/08944393221093467>
41. Boas, T. C., Christenson, D. P. & Glick, D. M. (2020). Recruiting large online samples in the United States and India: Facebook, Mechanical Turk, and Qualtrics. *Political Science Research Methods*, 8, (232–250). <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2018.28>
42. Walker, R. et al. (2013). Poverty in Global Perspective: Is Shame a Common Denominator? *Journal of Social Policy*, 42 (215–233). <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279412000979>
43. Ahamadou, M. (2025). Trust in Fiscal Institutions in Africa: Do Perceived Living Conditions Matter? *African Development Review*, 37 (2). <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8268.70014>
44. Mau, S., Lux, T. & Westheuser, L. (2024). *Triggerpunkte: Konsens und Konflikt in der Gegenwartsgesellschaft*. Suhrkamp.
45. Pickett, K. E. et al. (2026). Wellbeing for people and the planet: how to value everyone and everything on a thriving planet beyond 2030. *The Lancet Planetary Health*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101475>
46. Kenter, J. O. et al. (2025). Ten principles for transforming economics in a time of global crises. *Nature Sustainability*, 8 (7) (837–847). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-025-01562-4>
47. Salvia, A. (2025). Nuevo Escenario Político-Económico: Estrés y Bienestar en una Argentina en Transición : Agenda para las Deudassociales. Observatorio de la Deuda Social Argentina (ODSA). <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XJQUtMxDjGEW7g7GzJgrAvoRqADfUVaN/view?pli=1>
48. Universidad de Buenos Aires, Observatorio Psicología Social Aplicada & UBA Psicología (2026). *Monitor de Inseguridad n° 13*. https://www.psi.uba.ar/opsa/documentos/informes/Monitor%20de%20Inseguridad%20N%C2%BA%2013_1.pdf
49. Datafolha, Institutot de Pesquisas (2026). *Economia e Sociedade*. <https://media.folha.uol.com.br/datafolha/2026/03/12/s6vyrhd-mtxg7ctfh4lpryqwuykgexezh-sa1vz1xro.pdf>

50. Datafolha (2025). *Pesquisa Eleitoral, Avaliação de Governo e Opinião*. Datafolha and Brazilian Bar Association (OAB). <https://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/>
51. Leger (2026). *Economic Confidence Report* (Leger publication #10651-10014591). <https://leger360.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Leger-EconomicConfidence-CANADA-Jan2026.pdf>
52. Teinturier, B., Gallard, M., Latrille, P. & Lamotte, D. (2025). *Fractures Françaises: Le Monde, La Fondation Jean Jaurès, Le Cevipofet l'Institut Montaigne*. Ipsos bva CESI école d'ingénieurs. <https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/fractures-francaises-2025>
53. Infratest dimap (2026). *ARD-DeutschlandTREND Februar 2026*. <https://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2026/februar/>
54. UK Office for National Statistics (2026). *Public opinions and social trends, Great Britain*. Office for National Statistics. <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/bulletins/publicopinionsandsocialtrends-greatbritain/may2026>
55. Skinner, G. (2025). *Divided Britain*. Ipsos. <https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/85-britons-continue-believe-britain-divided-over-half-think-differences-peoples-political-views-are>
56. Candigliota, G. et al. (2026). *Rapporto Italia 2026*. Eurispes. <https://eurispes.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/sintesi-rapporto-italia-2026-copia.pdf>
57. Turner, M. (2026). *What Worries the World - February 2026*. Ipsos. <https://www.ipsos.com/en-ch/what-worries-world-february-2026>
58. Fukaya, H. & Shimbun, Y. (2026). *Japanese People Becoming More Resistant to Foreign Workers, Surveys Show*. The Japan News, 15 June 2026.
59. Edelman Trust Institute (2026). *2026 Edelman Trust Barometer: Trust Amid Insularity - Japan Report*. Edelman Trust Institute. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/jp/2026-04/2026%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer_Japan%20Report.pdf
60. Nadler, J. *What Worries the World - January 2026*. Ipsos. <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2026-02/What-Worries-the-World-January-2026.pdf>
61. Edelman Trust Institute (2026). *2026 Edelman Trust Barometer: Trust Amid Insularity - South Africa Report*. Edelman Trust Institute. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2026-04/2026%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer_South%20Africa%20Report%203.pdf
62. Mpako, A. & Ndoma, S. (2026). *Democracy on Shaky Ground in South Africa as Dissatisfaction with Its Functioning Abounds*. AfroBarometer. <https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/AD1170-Democracy-on-shaky-ground-in-South-Africa-Afrobarometer-16apr26.pdf>
63. 정세정 (2025). *사회통합 실패진단 및 대응방안(XII): 사회 인식 변화의 다차원성*. <https://www.kihasa.re.kr/publish/report/view?type=all&seq=73408>
64. Dunne, M. (2025). *Predictions 2026 Report*. Ipsos. <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2025-12/ipsos-2026-predictions-survey-report.pdf>
65. Edelman Trust Institute (2026). *2026 Edelman Trust Barometer: Trust Amid Insularity - Sweden Report*. Edelman Trust Institute. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2026-04/2026%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer_Sweden%20Report.pdf
66. Wall Street Journal & NORC (2025). *WSJ/NORC Poll July 2025*. https://www.norc.umd.edu/content/dam/norc-org/pdf2025/WSJ_NORC_Jul2025_Topline.pdf
67. Bell, P. (2025). *Public Trust in Government: 1958-2025*. Pew Research Center. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/12/04/public-trust-in-government-1958-2025/>

8. Methodology and background

The Earth for All Survey 2026 is the third wave in a programme commissioned by Earth4All and conducted by Ipsos, following the Global Commons Survey (2021) and the Earth for All Survey (2024).

In this survey Ipsos conducted research to measure how citizens across G20 nations (plus Sweden) perceive the current trajectory of social cohesion in their countries. Questions focused on economic inequality, government trust, social cohesion and perceived division, systems change and climate mandate. This report focuses on all these topics.

This report is a pilot for future follow-up reports on social tension and cohesion.

Ipsos surveyed 13,516 participants aged 18 to 55–75 across 17 countries. This included Argentina (501), Australia (1,000), Brazil (1,001), Canada (1,001), France (1,001), Germany (1,001), India (501), Indonesia (1,001), Italy (1,001), Japan (1,001), Mexico (501), South Africa (500), South Korea (501), Sweden (501), Türkiye (501), Great Britain (1,001) and the United States (1,002). All interviews were conducted online and took place between 20 February and 6 March 2026, using Ipsos's Global Advisor monthly omnibus survey. Given the contents of the survey, it was not possible to carry out data collection in China and Saudi Arabia. Russia was not included due to the Ukrainian war.

Quota sampling was used, and in each country data are weighted to be representative of the national population by age, gender, region and working status. Global totals are based on an average of the weighted data across the countries, such that each country counts equally to the total. Where percentages do not sum to 100, this may be due to rounding, multiple responses or the exclusion of “don't know” categories.

The following table provides the sample sizes, age ranges and languages covered. It is important to note that in countries with lower internet penetration, the samples represent more urban, educated and digitally connected populations. This applies to Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Türkiye.

Countries were split into three groups to support analysis and inference:

- ▶ **High income:** Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Sweden and the United States.
- ▶ **Upper-middle income:** Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Türkiye.
- ▶ **Lower-middle income:** India.

Differences between sub-groups are highlighted in the report where the differences were statistically significant. The following definitions are noted:

- ▶ **“Right-leaning”** and **“left-leaning”** political party supporters are based on recoding a question on self-identified political party support into these categories. This was available in all countries.

About Earth4All

Earth4All is an international initiative to accelerate the systems changes we need for an equitable future on a finite planet. Combining the best available science with new economic thinking, Earth4All was designed to identify the transformations we need to create prosperity for all.

Earth4All was initiated by the [Club of Rome](#), the [Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research](#), the [Stockholm Resilience Centre](#) and the [BI Norwegian Business School](#). It builds on the legacies of [*The Limits to Growth*](#) and the [planetary boundaries frameworks](#).